This is Why the Royals Can't Have Nice Things

In 1985, the Kansas City Royals won the World Series. In the 27 seasons since then, they've been to the playoffs exactly zero times. They've finished above .500 only six times in that span (and only once in the last twenty years). The franchise has been singularly awful for nearly three decades -- and there's a fairly obvious reason why.

Since that championship season in 1985, the Royals have walked at an above-average rate in just one season: 1989. In every one of those other 26 seasons, they finished in the bottom half of baseball in walks. Last year, they were dead last (as they were in 2008, and in 2001). This season, they rank 27th in the category. Since 1986, the Royals have the worst walk percentage (7.7%) among all major league franchises.

This team's extended streak of missing the playoffs happens to be accompanied by a similarly epic streak of plate discipline futility. It's not exactly a stretch to posit a relationship between those two things. If anyone ever doubted the value of walks in this sport, they should take a quick look at what the Kansas City Royals have been since Ronald Reagan's second term.

Why? Why are the Royals allergic to ball four? In a Thursday article on FoxSports.com, Royals general manager Dayton Moore offered an explanation: his team's home ballpark, Kauffman Stadium.

"We have the largest ballpark in terms of square footage of any ballpark in baseball," Moore says. "When pitchers come here, they have the mindset to use that park -- put the ball in play, throw strikes, attack the zone. There isn't the same fear factor of getting beat deep that you might have elsewhere. I think that plays a huge factor in that walk statistic."

On the surface, that seems logical. Not only for the reason Moore provides; also because Kauffman happens to be one of the only common denominators for the franchise between 1986 and 2013. What else could explain a trend that has spanned multiple decades, front offices, and rosters?

Dig a little deeper, though, and it immediately becomes clear that this theory is completely bogus. It's grounded in no facts whatsoever. In fact, it's so completely wrong that it encourages us to question whether or not Dayton Moore even has access to the Internet. Because: last year, the Royals drew 202 walks at home ...... and 202 walks on the road. Oops. The Royals were just as bad at walking away from home as they were at Kauffman. Accessing that information takes about three seconds in 2013.

Yet that's not all. In 2011, the Royals actually drew more walks at home (235) than on the road (207). The same was true in 2009, when they drew 235 walks at home and 199 times on the road. In 2008, the totals were virtually equal (197 to 195). In 2006, they once again drew more walks at home (252 to 222). These are all pretty simple facts to look up.

Taking it one step further: since 1986, Royals hitters have walked 7.6% of the time when playing at home, which ranks dead last among all franchises. This would seem to support Dayton Moore's hypothesis. But over that same span, Royals hitters have actually walked at an even worse rate when on the road -- 7.0%. That also ranks dead last among all franchises. The Royals are terrible at walking no matter where they play, but they're slightly-less terrible at walking when they're in Kauffman. Which makes Dayton Moore's comments look even more wrong.

There is, of course, more. If Moore's theory was accurate, and Kauffman's spacious confines deflate walk totals, then Royals pitchers probably shouldn't be giving up very many walks. The stadium should be affecting hitters on both teams. But since 1986, Royals pitchers have actually walked hitters at an 8.6% rate when pitching at home. That's the 7th-highest such rate in baseball. So opposing hitters are certainly drawing walks against the Royals in Kauffman. Don't the stadium's dimensions affect those hitters, too?

One final counterpoint: if a large stadium suppresses walk rates the way Moore proposed, then the Oakland Athletics should have a similarly poor record with walks. Like Kansas City, Oakland also plays in a massive ballpark with endless tracts of foul territory. So how would Moore explain the fact that since 1986, the Athletics have the best walk percentage (9.8%) among all major league teams?

Basically, Dayton Moore's hypothesis flunks any kind of empirical testing. The Royals walk more in Kauffman than they do on the road. Opposing hitters draw a healthy dose of walks against the Royals in Kauffman. And the league's most successful walking team in the last three decades resides in a ballpark that's comparable in size to Kauffman. Strikes one, two, and three.

The stadium isn't the problem. The problem is the hitters playing inside of it. And Dayton Moore was the person responsible for acquiring those hitters. Moore drafted Mike Moustakas with the 2nd overall pick in 2007, and he has a .286 career OBP in the majors. Moore drafted Eric Hosmer with the 3rd overall pick in 2008, and he has a .322 career OBP in the majors. Moore traded for Alcides Escobar in the Zack Greinke deal, and he has a .303 career OBP in the majors. Moore's second basemen right now are Miguel Tejada and Chris Getz, who have probably walked a combined 20 times in their careers, roughly. Most damningly, Moore thinks the most walk-averse hitter in the league, Jeff Francoeur, is a valuable baseball player (he has a career .308 OBP). The Royals' problem is their personnel, and Dayton Moore's job is to manage the Royals' personnel, so the Royals' problem is Dayton Moore. Which is probably why Moore is getting ahead of the curve and trying to pin the blame on an inanimate building rather than accept responsibility himself. Moore can point his finger at Kauffman Stadium if he'd like, but if he wants to keep his job for a little while longer, he's going to need a better scapegoat. This one was rather flimsy to say the least.

Rockies, Royals Author Most Depressing Trade Ever

Jeremy Guthrie and Jonathan Sanchez belong in a Russian novel. Both pitchers were acquired, by the Rockies and Royals respectively, this past offseason in their final years of arbitration-eligibility before hitting free agency. And both were astonishingly, unfathomably bad.

Guthrie threw 90.2 innings in Colorado, and the Rockies painfully learned that a flyball pitcher and Coors Field don't mix. Guthrie allowed 21 home runs, leading to a 6.35 ERA. His WHIP: 1.68. His brief demotion to the bullpen was what led to the Rockies' weird four-man rotation thing. He's being paid $8.2 million. And what did the Rockies give up to acquire this gem? Only Jason Hammel, who emerged as a legitimate front-of-the-rotation starter for the Orioles this season.

Jonathan Sanchez accomplished the seemingly impossible task of being a worse pitcher than Jeremy Guthrie. His ERA for the Royals was at 7.76 before they recently designated him for assignment. He achieved the Holy Grail for bad pitchers--notching more walks (44) than strikeouts (36) in just 53.1 innings. He lasted more than five innings exactly once in 2012. Salary: $5.6 million. And what did the Royals give up to acquire this utterly lost, formerly-major-league pitcher? Only Melky Cabrera, the league-wide hits leader and All-Star Game MVP.

So, in the only logical course of action, the Rockies and Royals finally decided to throw up white flags. On Friday, the two teams swapped Jeremy Guthrie and Jonathan Sanchez, each hoping to dump their humiliating bust on the other in the most depressing transaction in recent memory.

The only relevant commentary is that this trade is akin to two sick men, lying in adjacent hospital beds, irrationally hoping for just a little relief to their pain by agreeing to trade diseases.

MLB Season Preview: Kansas City Royals

The Royals don't have the pitching to contend this year, but they certainly have some impressive young pieces to build around.

Once hyped as the next George Brett, Alex
Gordon finally delivered on that promise in 2011.

Offense: Kansas City actually scored the 10th-most runs in baseball last year. The budding star is first baseman Eric Hosmer, who, as a 21-year-old last year, hit .293 with 19 homers and 11 steals in 128 games. He looks like a perennial All-Star and cornerstone of the Royals' lineup. He's pushed Billy Butler, a good contact hitter who has yet to develop big power, to the DH slot permanently. Outfielders Alex Gordon and Jeff Francoeur both finally shed the 'bust' label in 2011--Gordon had his long-awaited breakout by hitting .303/.376/.502 with 23 homers and 17 steals, and Francoeur overcame his miserable OBP by hitting .285 with 20 homers and 22 steals. There's not much else, though. Mike Moustakas will be a star someday at third, but he may not be ready yet. Catcher-of-the-future Salvador Perez will miss the first few months of the season. Center-fielder Lorenzo Cain and shortstop Alcides Escobar, acquired in the Zack Greinke trade, are excellent defensively but need to prove they can hit in the majors.

Meet Bruce Chen, a 34-year-old
journeyman...and KC's Opening
Day starter.

Pitching: The Royals are still waiting on most of their top arms. The veterans are Jonathan Sanchez, whose excellent strikeout numbers are accompanied by too many walks and DL stints, and Bruce Chen, an unexciting back-of-the-rotation guy. Former #1-overall pick Luke Hochevar showed signs of promise last year but his 4.68 ERA was the best of his career. Felipe Paulino was looking like a solid breakout candidate until he went on the DL with elbow troubles, so Luis Mendoza and top prospect Danny Duffy will fill out the rotation. The bullpen lost closer Joakim Soria for the season, but Aaron Crow was an All-Star last year, Greg Holland has emerged as a dominant setup man, and the Royals brought in Jonathan Broxton as a reclamation project.

Eric Hosmer: Future Stud.

Breakout Candidates: He's already experienced major league success, but Eric Hosmer is poised to take the league by storm as a 22-year-old. He'll hit for average and power and even sprinkle in some steals. The good news for the Royals is that he's not even a free agent until 2018. On the mound, Crow or Hochevar could experience improvement, but the pitcher to watch is Greg Holland, who might emerge as one of the AL's best closers if given the chance.

3 Key Questions: Was 2011 an outlier for Gordon and Francoeur, or will they produce big numbers again? Which members of the young infield will take the next step? And will any of the starters post an ERA below 4.00?

Best Case Scenario: Jonathan Sanchez controls his walks, Crow and Hochevar break out, Hosmer and Gordon are MVP candidates, and the young Royals finish above .500 for just the second time since 1994.

Worst Case Scenario: The starting pitching is a nightmare, Gordon and Francoeur take a step back, the young position players struggle mightily, and the Royals finish fourth in yet another losing season.

Predicted Finish: A stealthy-good offense will lead the Royals to a .500 record and a third-place finish in the AL Central. Things are finally looking up in Kansas City.