Just a few moments ago, in the top of the ninth inning in Game 3, Red Sox manager John Farrell let his pitcher hit in a tie game. As in, with Brandon Workman (a pitcher) due up against elite closer Trevor Rosenthal, with one out in the ninth inning of a tie game, Farrell chose to allow his pitcher to bat rather than use a pinch-hitter. Now, some quick reminders:
A) pinch-hitting is a legal strategy in National League baseball
B) it was a tie game
C) Brandon Workman is a rookie pitcher with zero career at-bats in his professional career
D) it was a tie game in the World Series
E) rookie pitchers with zero at-bats aren't good at hitting
F) it was a tie game in the ninth inning in the World Series
By letting Workman hit against Rosenthal, Farrell was literally throwing away an out. The rules of baseball granted him three outs in the ninth inning, and he refused that offer. "Nah, I'm good with two, thanks." There are only two hypothetical scenarios where letting Workman "hit" in a tie game in the ninth makes an ounce of sense:
1. The Red Sox had no pitchers left and Workman was their last hope.
2. The Red Sox had no hitters left and therefore couldn't replace Workman with anyone.
Did the Red Sox have a pitcher left? They actually had three. And one of them was Koji Uehara, only one of the three most dominant pitchers in the league this year.
Did the Red Sox have a hitter left? Well, Mike Napoli, for one. Otherwise known as this team's starting first baseman for the entire season.
What makes this decision even more mind-boggling is the events in the bottom of the ninth. Workman began the inning (obviously, after the huge price Farrell paid to keep him eligible). He struck out Matt Adams. Then Yadier Molina singled. And then ... JOHN FARRELL TOOK BRANDON WORKMAN OUT OF THE GAME.
AAAHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH
In the top of the inning, Farrell decided that keeping Workman on the mound was of such paramount importance, so critical to his team's chances of winning, that he let him "bat" against Rosenthal, instead of pinch-hitting Mike Napoli and bringing in Uehara. Then in the bottom of the inning, all it took was a one-out single to convince Farrell that Workman no longer offered any value and it was time to use Uehara.
This begs the question: if Farrell was going to remove Workman after just one measly baserunner anyway -- if his leash was that short to begin with -- why was it so important that he remain in the game? If he was willing to use Uehara in the ninth all along, why not pinch-hit for Workman (with Mike Napoli!) and have Uehara start the ninth with a clean inning? There was no logic here. This was a stupendously stupid in-game decision by someone who's being paid millions of dollars by a premier sports franchise to make good in-game decisions.
After the game, Farrell said this:
"In hindsight having Workman bat against Rosenthal was a mismatch."
Wait a second -- you needed hindsight to realize that your pitcher batting against a closer who throws 100 miles per hour was a mismatch???
The Red Sox technically lost Game 3 on a bizarre obstruction call. They really lost it the moment their manager let a pitcher hit in the top of the ninth of a tied game in the World Series -- with a great hitter available to pinch-hit and a great reliever ready to take the mound -- and then removed him from the game anyway after facing just two more hitters. Awful awful awful.
Showing posts with label Managers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Managers. Show all posts
Saturday, October 26, 2013
Tuesday, October 8, 2013
Managers and Mistakes
One of the many quirks of baseball is how little a manager can do to help his team win games. Compared to a sport like football, where coaching is everything, baseball managers don't offer much positive value. Take Joe Maddon off the Rays and they're still a good team; put him on the Padres and they're still a bad team. A manager's most important functions are filling out a lineup card and making pitching changes; the success of those 'strategic' moves are mostly decided by the personnel at his disposal, which a manager does not control. Unless he's batting Delmon Young leadoff, or using Freddy Garcia as an ace reliever, a manager's typical functions don't allow him the opportunity to really hurt the quality of their team.
That's why the collective failures of John Farrell, Don Mattingly, and Fredi Gonzalez on Monday night were so impressive. All three managed to make questionable strategic blunders in their Game 4 matchups, proving that managers really can have a negative impact on their teams -- if you try hard enough.
Mistake 1: John Farrell Gets What He Asked For
Up 2-0 in the best-of-three series, Red Sox manager John Farrell came tantalizingly close to finishing off the Rays in the ALDS on Monday. Game 3 was tied headed into the top of the eighth, and David Ortiz led off the inning with a walk. Farrell decided to pinch-run for Ortiz with Quintin Berry, removing Ortiz from the game. This wasn't a bad decision on its own -- Farrell was playing for the go-ahead run, and Berry is one of the best base-stealers around. In fact, he stole second (though possibly helped by a blown call).
After a groundout, intentional walk, and a strikeout, Stephen Drew was due up with two outs and runners on first and second. Jake McGee, a lefty, was on the mound. Drew has been miserable against lefties this season -- a .196 average and .246 OBP. Fortunately, Farrell had an option on his bench: Xander Bogaerts, one of the top young prospects in the game, a right-handed hitter who could pinch-hit for Drew and replace him at shortstop. But Farrell didn't use him. Drew popped out, ending the inning. Farrell gave up Ortiz for the rest of the game in a gamble to try and score the go-ahead run, but by letting Drew hit against a lefty, he compromised his chances of scoring that run. Why is Bogaerts on the postseason roster if Farrell isn't going to use him in that situation?
The strangeness of that decision was compounded by another one an inning later. The Rays had grabbed a 4-3 lead, so the Red Sox were down to their last three outs in the top of the ninth facing Rays closer Fernando Rodney. The inning began with a five-pitch walk to Will Middlebrooks and a single by Jacoby Ellsbury, putting the tying and go-ahead runs on base. Rodney's control was iffy -- six of his first seven pitches were balls. But then Shane Victorino laid down a bunt, moving the runners over to second and third. If John Farrell instructed Victorino to bunt, then it's absolutely fair to question his judgment.
Because Farrell had already removed his cleanup hitter Ortiz, Boston's chances of winning an extended extra inning game weren't good, especially since they were on the road. The Red Sox should have been trying to win the game in the ninth by scoring multiple runs in the inning. They were in a great situation to do just that, with two runners on, good speed on the bases, a shaky Rodney on the mound, and Shane Victorino and Dustin Pedroia due up. Instead, Farrell chose to give away Victorino's at-bat to play for one run. Even though Victorino isn't a double play risk; even though he's been awesome against right-handed pitching; even though Rodney hadn't yet proven he could actually throw a strike.
Victorino bunted the runners over and a Pedroia ground-out did get that tying run home. But the winning run was stranded when pinch-hitter Mike Carp (batting at the DH spot where Ortiz would have been, mind you) struck out. And the Rays won the game on Jose Lobaton's walk-off in the bottom of the inning.
John Farrell asked for one run. He got exactly one run. Unsurprisingly, he also got a loss.
Mistake 2: Don Mattingly's Bunt Fetish
There might not be any manager in baseball who likes to bunt more than Dodgers manager Don Mattingly. Hopefully, the 8th inning of Monday's Game 4 against the Atlanta Braves will teach him a lesson. (Spoiler: it won't.)
Entering the top of the eighth inning, things were looking pretty grim for the Dodgers. Sure, they were up 2-1 in the series, but they were also trailing by a run with six outs to go in Game 4 against a dynamite Braves bullpen. A loss would mean that the Dodgers had wasted a Clayton Kershaw start on short rest against notable zombie Freddy Garcia with a decisive Game 5 looming in Atlanta. Without a doubt, this was a dire situation.
Yasiel Puig provided a spark by leading off the bottom of the eighth with a double. Juan Uribe was due up next ... and Mattingly apparently asked him to bunt Puig over to third. Now, Juan Uribe is no Shane Victorino. He's not a particularly good hitter. But he's above average, which is more than you can say for the guys following Uribe in the lineup: Skip Schumaker and A.J. Ellis. Both are pretty bad hitters. Uribe was clearly the best chance the Dodgers had at scoring the tying run. And Mattingly wanted to throw away that chance to put the game in the hands of Skip Schumaker and A.J. Ellis. Bad idea.
Fortunately, Juan Uribe is a bad bunter. He failed to put the ball in play twice, taking the bunt off the table. And then he crushed a two-run homer, putting the Dodgers on top 4-3 and sending them to the NLCS.
See, John Farrell? Sometimes, when you let your players hit instead of sacrificing them to the God of Bunts, good things happen.
Mistake 3: Fredi Gonzalez Doesn't Budge
This was easily the least forgivable mistake of the three. Farrell and Mattingly's teams were both ahead in their respective series; Gonzalez's Braves were down 2-1, one loss away from the end of their season. His mistake had far more lasting consequences.
Gonzalez was on the other side of that dramatic Uribe home run. His team was up 3-2, needing six more outs to stave off elimination and force a Game 5 in Atlanta. He brought in setup man David Carpenter to pitch the eighth, not a poor decision considering how good he's been this season. But then Puig led off the inning with a double, and suddenly the tying run was on second and the go-ahead run was at the plate. And with the best short-stint pitcher in the world available to him in the bullpen, Fredi Gonzalez never budged from the dugout.
That's amazing if you think about it. The Braves were up a run in the eighth inning of a game they needed to win, and Craig Kimbrel didn't even face a single batter. Kimbrel is the best relief pitcher in baseball. Over the past two seasons combined, he has a 1.11 ERA with 214 strikeouts and just 66 hits allowed in 129.2 innings. David Carpenter is great, but Craig Kimbrel is better, because Craig Kimbrel is the best.
Still, Gonzalez stuck with Carpenter after the leadoff double to Puig. He's shown a willingness to bring in Kimbrel for a four-out save in the past (he did it in Game 2 of this series, in fact). But needing six outs, in an elimination game, with the tying run on second? In that scenario, Gonzalez refused to summon Kimbrel. To reiterate: had the season been on the line with four outs to go, Kimbrel would've been in the game. But with the season on the line with six outs to go, Kimbrel wasn't an option. That rigid stubbornness lost the Braves the game, as Uribe hit the game-winning two-run homer off Carpenter with Kimbrel watching helplessly from the bullpen.
We traditionally think of mistakes as sudden, unwise deviations from an expected course of action. This mistake wasn't that at all. It wasn't a mental lapse or a brain fart. Quite the opposite: Gonzalez actually adhered to the same bullpen routine he's always followed, the same bullpen routine that got him to the playoffs in the first place -- Carpenter in the eighth, Kimbrel in the ninth. And that right there was the problem. Compared to the regular season, the playoffs are a different beast. Elimination games are a completely different beast. Desperate situations require flexibility; they require creativity; they require the willingness to push your best players to their physical limits, like the Dodgers did by starting Clayton Kershaw on three days' rest. The conservative Fredi Gonzalez showed none of those qualities. Instead, all he had was The Plan. And when The Plan went awry, he was left with nothing.
That's why the collective failures of John Farrell, Don Mattingly, and Fredi Gonzalez on Monday night were so impressive. All three managed to make questionable strategic blunders in their Game 4 matchups, proving that managers really can have a negative impact on their teams -- if you try hard enough.
Mistake 1: John Farrell Gets What He Asked For
Up 2-0 in the best-of-three series, Red Sox manager John Farrell came tantalizingly close to finishing off the Rays in the ALDS on Monday. Game 3 was tied headed into the top of the eighth, and David Ortiz led off the inning with a walk. Farrell decided to pinch-run for Ortiz with Quintin Berry, removing Ortiz from the game. This wasn't a bad decision on its own -- Farrell was playing for the go-ahead run, and Berry is one of the best base-stealers around. In fact, he stole second (though possibly helped by a blown call).
After a groundout, intentional walk, and a strikeout, Stephen Drew was due up with two outs and runners on first and second. Jake McGee, a lefty, was on the mound. Drew has been miserable against lefties this season -- a .196 average and .246 OBP. Fortunately, Farrell had an option on his bench: Xander Bogaerts, one of the top young prospects in the game, a right-handed hitter who could pinch-hit for Drew and replace him at shortstop. But Farrell didn't use him. Drew popped out, ending the inning. Farrell gave up Ortiz for the rest of the game in a gamble to try and score the go-ahead run, but by letting Drew hit against a lefty, he compromised his chances of scoring that run. Why is Bogaerts on the postseason roster if Farrell isn't going to use him in that situation?
The strangeness of that decision was compounded by another one an inning later. The Rays had grabbed a 4-3 lead, so the Red Sox were down to their last three outs in the top of the ninth facing Rays closer Fernando Rodney. The inning began with a five-pitch walk to Will Middlebrooks and a single by Jacoby Ellsbury, putting the tying and go-ahead runs on base. Rodney's control was iffy -- six of his first seven pitches were balls. But then Shane Victorino laid down a bunt, moving the runners over to second and third. If John Farrell instructed Victorino to bunt, then it's absolutely fair to question his judgment.
Because Farrell had already removed his cleanup hitter Ortiz, Boston's chances of winning an extended extra inning game weren't good, especially since they were on the road. The Red Sox should have been trying to win the game in the ninth by scoring multiple runs in the inning. They were in a great situation to do just that, with two runners on, good speed on the bases, a shaky Rodney on the mound, and Shane Victorino and Dustin Pedroia due up. Instead, Farrell chose to give away Victorino's at-bat to play for one run. Even though Victorino isn't a double play risk; even though he's been awesome against right-handed pitching; even though Rodney hadn't yet proven he could actually throw a strike.
Victorino bunted the runners over and a Pedroia ground-out did get that tying run home. But the winning run was stranded when pinch-hitter Mike Carp (batting at the DH spot where Ortiz would have been, mind you) struck out. And the Rays won the game on Jose Lobaton's walk-off in the bottom of the inning.
John Farrell asked for one run. He got exactly one run. Unsurprisingly, he also got a loss.
Mistake 2: Don Mattingly's Bunt Fetish
There might not be any manager in baseball who likes to bunt more than Dodgers manager Don Mattingly. Hopefully, the 8th inning of Monday's Game 4 against the Atlanta Braves will teach him a lesson. (Spoiler: it won't.)
Entering the top of the eighth inning, things were looking pretty grim for the Dodgers. Sure, they were up 2-1 in the series, but they were also trailing by a run with six outs to go in Game 4 against a dynamite Braves bullpen. A loss would mean that the Dodgers had wasted a Clayton Kershaw start on short rest against notable zombie Freddy Garcia with a decisive Game 5 looming in Atlanta. Without a doubt, this was a dire situation.
Yasiel Puig provided a spark by leading off the bottom of the eighth with a double. Juan Uribe was due up next ... and Mattingly apparently asked him to bunt Puig over to third. Now, Juan Uribe is no Shane Victorino. He's not a particularly good hitter. But he's above average, which is more than you can say for the guys following Uribe in the lineup: Skip Schumaker and A.J. Ellis. Both are pretty bad hitters. Uribe was clearly the best chance the Dodgers had at scoring the tying run. And Mattingly wanted to throw away that chance to put the game in the hands of Skip Schumaker and A.J. Ellis. Bad idea.
Fortunately, Juan Uribe is a bad bunter. He failed to put the ball in play twice, taking the bunt off the table. And then he crushed a two-run homer, putting the Dodgers on top 4-3 and sending them to the NLCS.
See, John Farrell? Sometimes, when you let your players hit instead of sacrificing them to the God of Bunts, good things happen.
Mistake 3: Fredi Gonzalez Doesn't Budge
This was easily the least forgivable mistake of the three. Farrell and Mattingly's teams were both ahead in their respective series; Gonzalez's Braves were down 2-1, one loss away from the end of their season. His mistake had far more lasting consequences.
Gonzalez was on the other side of that dramatic Uribe home run. His team was up 3-2, needing six more outs to stave off elimination and force a Game 5 in Atlanta. He brought in setup man David Carpenter to pitch the eighth, not a poor decision considering how good he's been this season. But then Puig led off the inning with a double, and suddenly the tying run was on second and the go-ahead run was at the plate. And with the best short-stint pitcher in the world available to him in the bullpen, Fredi Gonzalez never budged from the dugout.
That's amazing if you think about it. The Braves were up a run in the eighth inning of a game they needed to win, and Craig Kimbrel didn't even face a single batter. Kimbrel is the best relief pitcher in baseball. Over the past two seasons combined, he has a 1.11 ERA with 214 strikeouts and just 66 hits allowed in 129.2 innings. David Carpenter is great, but Craig Kimbrel is better, because Craig Kimbrel is the best.
Still, Gonzalez stuck with Carpenter after the leadoff double to Puig. He's shown a willingness to bring in Kimbrel for a four-out save in the past (he did it in Game 2 of this series, in fact). But needing six outs, in an elimination game, with the tying run on second? In that scenario, Gonzalez refused to summon Kimbrel. To reiterate: had the season been on the line with four outs to go, Kimbrel would've been in the game. But with the season on the line with six outs to go, Kimbrel wasn't an option. That rigid stubbornness lost the Braves the game, as Uribe hit the game-winning two-run homer off Carpenter with Kimbrel watching helplessly from the bullpen.
We traditionally think of mistakes as sudden, unwise deviations from an expected course of action. This mistake wasn't that at all. It wasn't a mental lapse or a brain fart. Quite the opposite: Gonzalez actually adhered to the same bullpen routine he's always followed, the same bullpen routine that got him to the playoffs in the first place -- Carpenter in the eighth, Kimbrel in the ninth. And that right there was the problem. Compared to the regular season, the playoffs are a different beast. Elimination games are a completely different beast. Desperate situations require flexibility; they require creativity; they require the willingness to push your best players to their physical limits, like the Dodgers did by starting Clayton Kershaw on three days' rest. The conservative Fredi Gonzalez showed none of those qualities. Instead, all he had was The Plan. And when The Plan went awry, he was left with nothing.
Thursday, July 19, 2012
Lefty/Righty Doesn't Really Matter
Old-school managers feel a compulsive need to alternate right-handed and left-handed hitters in their lineups. Theoretically, this makes the late innings difficult to navigate for the opposing manager, who must micromanage his bullpen arms to get the match-ups he wants.
Sometimes, this obsession with lefty-righty lineup symmetry goes too far and actually hurts a team's scoring expectancy. The relevant example here lies with Mike Scioscia's Angels. Scioscia's middle-of-the-order bats are Albert Pujols and Mark Trumbo, but both are righties, so for much of the season Scioscia felt compelled to separate the two with switch-hitter Kendrys Morales. This is despite the fact that Trumbo is hitting a Josh Hamilton-like .309/.361/.630 with 26 homers, while Morales' power has disappeared en route to a .423 slugging percentage and 9 home runs. Only recently did Scioscia relent and move Trumbo into his rightful cleanup spot behind Pujols, finally allowing the two righties to hit back-to-back (oh, the humanity!). The improvement won't be enormous, but one would expect the Angels to score more runs with their best hitters now concentrated together in the lineup.
Bobby Valentine of the Red Sox, meanwhile, has none of Scioscia's qualms about putting same-side hitters next to each other. On Monday against the White Sox, he actually had four straight lefties lead off his lineup: Jacoby Ellsbury, Carl Crawford, David Ortiz, and Adrian Gonzalez. In the bottom of the seventh inning of a 1-1 tie, White Sox manager Robin Ventura pulled his right-handed starter with those four lefties due up next, predictably bringing in a left-handed reliever, Leyson Septimo. And what happened?
Crawford walked. Ortiz walked. Adrian Gonzalez homered. 4-1 Red Sox. They won the game. Sometimes, good hitters are just good hitters, regardless of theoretical platoon disadvantages.
Since lineup construction has a very small impact over the course of a long season, it doesn't matter THAT much whether managers choose to prioritize lefty-righty matchups or just plain production. But as a rule of thumb, bunching your best hitters together in the lineup, regardless of right- or left-handedness, is probably the better way to go.
Sometimes, this obsession with lefty-righty lineup symmetry goes too far and actually hurts a team's scoring expectancy. The relevant example here lies with Mike Scioscia's Angels. Scioscia's middle-of-the-order bats are Albert Pujols and Mark Trumbo, but both are righties, so for much of the season Scioscia felt compelled to separate the two with switch-hitter Kendrys Morales. This is despite the fact that Trumbo is hitting a Josh Hamilton-like .309/.361/.630 with 26 homers, while Morales' power has disappeared en route to a .423 slugging percentage and 9 home runs. Only recently did Scioscia relent and move Trumbo into his rightful cleanup spot behind Pujols, finally allowing the two righties to hit back-to-back (oh, the humanity!). The improvement won't be enormous, but one would expect the Angels to score more runs with their best hitters now concentrated together in the lineup.
Bobby Valentine of the Red Sox, meanwhile, has none of Scioscia's qualms about putting same-side hitters next to each other. On Monday against the White Sox, he actually had four straight lefties lead off his lineup: Jacoby Ellsbury, Carl Crawford, David Ortiz, and Adrian Gonzalez. In the bottom of the seventh inning of a 1-1 tie, White Sox manager Robin Ventura pulled his right-handed starter with those four lefties due up next, predictably bringing in a left-handed reliever, Leyson Septimo. And what happened?
Crawford walked. Ortiz walked. Adrian Gonzalez homered. 4-1 Red Sox. They won the game. Sometimes, good hitters are just good hitters, regardless of theoretical platoon disadvantages.
Since lineup construction has a very small impact over the course of a long season, it doesn't matter THAT much whether managers choose to prioritize lefty-righty matchups or just plain production. But as a rule of thumb, bunching your best hitters together in the lineup, regardless of right- or left-handedness, is probably the better way to go.
Sunday, June 10, 2012
Some Sweeping, False Statements About Managers
Which MLB managers have performed the best so far this year? Is it even possible to get a real answer to that question? Does any of this even matter? Nick Cafardo of the Boston Globe undertook the futile task of answering at least one of those questions in his article, Managers at the top of Major League Baseball. Cafardo ranks the "10 best performances by managers so far," and after reading through the list, I was left with oh so very many questions. Number one on the list, predictably:
"1. Don Mattingly, Dodgers - He has emerged as a good leader, one who has taken a bunch of Triple A players and made them winners."
No. No no no, no. The Dodgers are NOT a bunch of Triple-A players. Quite the opposite, actually. We're talking about a veteran-heavy roster that features Bobby Abreu, Jerry Hairston Jr., Mark Ellis, Adam Kennedy, Ted Lilly, Aaron Harang, and Chris Capuano in prominent roles. Those guys are almost old enough to have KIDS playing in Triple-A.
"Mattingly has certainly taken advantage of the weak National League West, and perhaps the Dodgers aren’t as good as their record indicates..."
But still! Mattingly's totally the man!
"4. Bobby Valentine, Red Sox - He has had about $80 million of payroll on the disabled list most of the season, losing two All-Star outfielders (Carl Crawford, Jacoby Ellsbury) and his closer (Andrew Bailey), but he has pieced together one of the majors’ best bullpens... He also has put together a lineup that is somehow still producing runs."
How?! How, exactly, has Bobby Valentine "put together" Boston's lineup? Did he trade for Adrian Gonzalez? Did he draft Will Middlebooks? Does he personally inject steroids into David Ortiz's bloodstream? How hard is it to write "Adrian Gonzalez" and "Dustin Pedroia" into the lineup everyday?????
"Valentine keeps emphasizing his type of baseball..."
What, exactly, is Valentine's type of baseball? I would do anything to get Nick Cafardo to answer this question. How exactly, specifically, is Bobby Valentine's style of baseball different from anyone else's?
"5. Buck Showalter, Orioles - Dead last, no questions asked, was the consensus on the Orioles before the season, but instead they have been in first place."
This might not be a bad selection. My problem is with the next bit:
"Showalter’s steady hand and leadership have kept his promising pitching staff consistent."
I know, I know, you're probably thinking, "How can a nebulous concept like 'leadership' possibly help pitchers get outs?" Well, I'm here to tell you non-believers that the only reason Jason Hammel has six wins and a sub-3.00 ERA is Buck Showalter's firm, crisp, leadershipy, steady hand.
"He, too, has managed injuries well, and has been able to survive with a lineup that hasn’t had All-Star second baseman Brian Roberts all season, and has also lost Nick Markakis and Mark Reynolds, among others, at times."
Yeah, everyone has to deal with injuries. But the phrase, "he...has been able to survive with a lineup that hasn't had All-Star second baseman Brian Roberts all season" is simply a joke. Roberts hasn't been an All-Star since 2007, and hasn't been healthy (or even good) since 2009. This is like saying, "Joe Girardi has been able to survive with a lineup that hasn't had All-Star second baseman Chuck Knoblauch all decade."
"6. Davey Johnson, Nationals - He has been able to manage through substantial injuries to his 3-4-5 hitters, his fifth starter, and his closer, plugging in the Steve Lombardozzis of the world and receiving top production. He has pieced together the best starting rotation in the NL..."
But, but...how, specifically, has Davey Johnson "pieced together" his rotation? That makes it sound like Johnson assembled the staff singlehandledly. But is he paying Edwin Jackson's salary? Did he give birth to Stephen Strasburg?
"...At the same time, he has introduced Bryce Harper to the majors and overseen Stephen Strasburg’s amazing comeback from Tommy John surgery."
Really? We're giving Davey Johnson credit for the success of two of the greatest baseball talents of the generation? I'm fairly certain neither Harper nor Strasburg need anyone's help.
"7. Mike Scioscia, Angels - How hard can it be with Albert Pujols and a great starting rotation?"
Right. Correct. Soooo....why is Scioscia still on this list?
"Well, consider that with Pujols struggling, the Angels were declared DOA by many in April, seen as one of the biggest busts in baseball."
So basically, the best way to inflate your reputation as a manager is to suck miserably for the first month of the season, to the point where your team is being labelled the biggest bust in baseball. Then, all you have to do is perform somewhat adequately the rest of the season, and suddenly you look awesome by comparison. The Scioscia Way.
"Scioscia didn’t allow that to continue. He fired hitting coach Mickey Hatcher, released outfielder Bobby Abreu, and seemed to send a message to his players that complacency would not be tolerated."
Uh....nope. Angels General Manager Jerry DiPoto did those things. Because he actually has that authority.
"And they’ve responded. Pujols has picked up the pace, and the Angels now look every bit as strong as they were supposed to be."
Meeting expectations. Mere adequacy. The Scioscia Way.
"9. Brad Mills, Astros - OK, hear me out. The Astros were playing .431 baseball through Friday, but that’s far better than anyone expected. Look at the lineup and tell me who half these guys are. They do have decent pitching, and Mills has gotten his players to buy into the idea that even though they’re building for the long haul, they can still compete now. Mills was always an extremely organized coach with the Red Sox and is the same way in Houston. He is executing the wishes of the new ownership, and it appears he will survive."
Apparently, the new criteria for being an exceptional manager include:
1. Winning 43% of the time.
2. Not getting fired.
"10. Clint Hurdle, Pirates - With that offense, this team has no business being three games over .500 (which it was through Friday). Hurdle seems to get the most out of his players, especially pitchers. He has found ways for his lineup to manufacture runs."
The most laughably incorrect claim of the entire article is saved for the very end. Clint Hurdle has NOT found ways for his lineup to manufacture runs. Pittsburgh has scored 188 runs all season. Which ranks...
...wait for it...
...dead last in all of baseball.
Yeah, Clint Hurdle definitely gets the most out of his players.
On a concluding note: while nebulous ideas like leadership and personality might be important for baseball managers, whatever impact they have occurs behind-the-scenes and can't be gauged by anyone outside of the clubhouse. When it comes to things we can actually measure, in-game decision-making is the most significant way a successful manager impacts the success of his team. That includes things like bullpen and bench management, setting a lineup, and defensive alignment. But somehow, there's hardly any mention of those strategic decisions in an article about successful managing, which makes the piece a completely subjective invention of narrative. Unfortunately, that's the norm when it comes to lazy evaluation of baseball managers.
"1. Don Mattingly, Dodgers - He has emerged as a good leader, one who has taken a bunch of Triple A players and made them winners."
No. No no no, no. The Dodgers are NOT a bunch of Triple-A players. Quite the opposite, actually. We're talking about a veteran-heavy roster that features Bobby Abreu, Jerry Hairston Jr., Mark Ellis, Adam Kennedy, Ted Lilly, Aaron Harang, and Chris Capuano in prominent roles. Those guys are almost old enough to have KIDS playing in Triple-A.
"Mattingly has certainly taken advantage of the weak National League West, and perhaps the Dodgers aren’t as good as their record indicates..."
But still! Mattingly's totally the man!
"4. Bobby Valentine, Red Sox - He has had about $80 million of payroll on the disabled list most of the season, losing two All-Star outfielders (Carl Crawford, Jacoby Ellsbury) and his closer (Andrew Bailey), but he has pieced together one of the majors’ best bullpens... He also has put together a lineup that is somehow still producing runs."
How?! How, exactly, has Bobby Valentine "put together" Boston's lineup? Did he trade for Adrian Gonzalez? Did he draft Will Middlebooks? Does he personally inject steroids into David Ortiz's bloodstream? How hard is it to write "Adrian Gonzalez" and "Dustin Pedroia" into the lineup everyday?????
"Valentine keeps emphasizing his type of baseball..."
What, exactly, is Valentine's type of baseball? I would do anything to get Nick Cafardo to answer this question. How exactly, specifically, is Bobby Valentine's style of baseball different from anyone else's?
"5. Buck Showalter, Orioles - Dead last, no questions asked, was the consensus on the Orioles before the season, but instead they have been in first place."
This might not be a bad selection. My problem is with the next bit:
"Showalter’s steady hand and leadership have kept his promising pitching staff consistent."
I know, I know, you're probably thinking, "How can a nebulous concept like 'leadership' possibly help pitchers get outs?" Well, I'm here to tell you non-believers that the only reason Jason Hammel has six wins and a sub-3.00 ERA is Buck Showalter's firm, crisp, leadershipy, steady hand.
"He, too, has managed injuries well, and has been able to survive with a lineup that hasn’t had All-Star second baseman Brian Roberts all season, and has also lost Nick Markakis and Mark Reynolds, among others, at times."
Yeah, everyone has to deal with injuries. But the phrase, "he...has been able to survive with a lineup that hasn't had All-Star second baseman Brian Roberts all season" is simply a joke. Roberts hasn't been an All-Star since 2007, and hasn't been healthy (or even good) since 2009. This is like saying, "Joe Girardi has been able to survive with a lineup that hasn't had All-Star second baseman Chuck Knoblauch all decade."
"6. Davey Johnson, Nationals - He has been able to manage through substantial injuries to his 3-4-5 hitters, his fifth starter, and his closer, plugging in the Steve Lombardozzis of the world and receiving top production. He has pieced together the best starting rotation in the NL..."
But, but...how, specifically, has Davey Johnson "pieced together" his rotation? That makes it sound like Johnson assembled the staff singlehandledly. But is he paying Edwin Jackson's salary? Did he give birth to Stephen Strasburg?
"...At the same time, he has introduced Bryce Harper to the majors and overseen Stephen Strasburg’s amazing comeback from Tommy John surgery."
Really? We're giving Davey Johnson credit for the success of two of the greatest baseball talents of the generation? I'm fairly certain neither Harper nor Strasburg need anyone's help.
"7. Mike Scioscia, Angels - How hard can it be with Albert Pujols and a great starting rotation?"
Right. Correct. Soooo....why is Scioscia still on this list?
"Well, consider that with Pujols struggling, the Angels were declared DOA by many in April, seen as one of the biggest busts in baseball."
So basically, the best way to inflate your reputation as a manager is to suck miserably for the first month of the season, to the point where your team is being labelled the biggest bust in baseball. Then, all you have to do is perform somewhat adequately the rest of the season, and suddenly you look awesome by comparison. The Scioscia Way.
"Scioscia didn’t allow that to continue. He fired hitting coach Mickey Hatcher, released outfielder Bobby Abreu, and seemed to send a message to his players that complacency would not be tolerated."
Uh....nope. Angels General Manager Jerry DiPoto did those things. Because he actually has that authority.
"And they’ve responded. Pujols has picked up the pace, and the Angels now look every bit as strong as they were supposed to be."
Meeting expectations. Mere adequacy. The Scioscia Way.
"9. Brad Mills, Astros - OK, hear me out. The Astros were playing .431 baseball through Friday, but that’s far better than anyone expected. Look at the lineup and tell me who half these guys are. They do have decent pitching, and Mills has gotten his players to buy into the idea that even though they’re building for the long haul, they can still compete now. Mills was always an extremely organized coach with the Red Sox and is the same way in Houston. He is executing the wishes of the new ownership, and it appears he will survive."
Apparently, the new criteria for being an exceptional manager include:
1. Winning 43% of the time.
2. Not getting fired.
"10. Clint Hurdle, Pirates - With that offense, this team has no business being three games over .500 (which it was through Friday). Hurdle seems to get the most out of his players, especially pitchers. He has found ways for his lineup to manufacture runs."
The most laughably incorrect claim of the entire article is saved for the very end. Clint Hurdle has NOT found ways for his lineup to manufacture runs. Pittsburgh has scored 188 runs all season. Which ranks...
...wait for it...
...dead last in all of baseball.
Yeah, Clint Hurdle definitely gets the most out of his players.
On a concluding note: while nebulous ideas like leadership and personality might be important for baseball managers, whatever impact they have occurs behind-the-scenes and can't be gauged by anyone outside of the clubhouse. When it comes to things we can actually measure, in-game decision-making is the most significant way a successful manager impacts the success of his team. That includes things like bullpen and bench management, setting a lineup, and defensive alignment. But somehow, there's hardly any mention of those strategic decisions in an article about successful managing, which makes the piece a completely subjective invention of narrative. Unfortunately, that's the norm when it comes to lazy evaluation of baseball managers.
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