Some Shrewd Baseball Wisdom From FOX

One of the pregame features of the Joe Buck/Tim McCarver baseball broadcast on FOX is called "Ford Keys to the Game." It's relatively self-explanatory -- it provides some broad goal each of the teams should be pursuing to best maximize their odds of winning, like "Get to the bullpen" or "No mistakes" or something else similarly obvious and/or cliche. It's usually a mindless exercise not even worth mentioning. But the "Keys to the Game" they rolled out before Monday's pivotal Game 5 in St. Louis represented a hilarious new low. With the series tied 2-apiece, here's the sage advice Buck and McCarver offered the Red Sox and Cardinals:

There you have it, folks: the key to winning the game is to win the game. But how exactly, you might ask? First, by winning the game, and second, by correctly advancing to the city where the next game will be played. Truly insightful, FOX.

Pinch-Hitting is Still Allowed, Right?

Just a few moments ago, in the top of the ninth inning in Game 3, Red Sox manager John Farrell let his pitcher hit in a tie game. As in, with Brandon Workman (a pitcher) due up against elite closer Trevor Rosenthal, with one out in the ninth inning of a tie game, Farrell chose to allow his pitcher to bat rather than use a pinch-hitter. Now, some quick reminders:

A) pinch-hitting is a legal strategy in National League baseball
B) it was a tie game
C) Brandon Workman is a rookie pitcher with zero career at-bats in his professional career
D) it was a tie game in the World Series
E) rookie pitchers with zero at-bats aren't good at hitting
F) it was a tie game in the ninth inning in the World Series

By letting Workman hit against Rosenthal, Farrell was literally throwing away an out. The rules of baseball granted him three outs in the ninth inning, and he refused that offer. "Nah, I'm good with two, thanks." There are only two hypothetical scenarios where letting Workman "hit" in a tie game in the ninth makes an ounce of sense:

1. The Red Sox had no pitchers left and Workman was their last hope.
2. The Red Sox had no hitters left and therefore couldn't replace Workman with anyone.

Did the Red Sox have a pitcher left? They actually had three. And one of them was Koji Uehara, only one of the three most dominant pitchers in the league this year.

Did the Red Sox have a hitter left? Well, Mike Napoli, for one. Otherwise known as this team's starting first baseman for the entire season.

What makes this decision even more mind-boggling is the events in the bottom of the ninth. Workman began the inning (obviously, after the huge price Farrell paid to keep him eligible). He struck out Matt Adams. Then Yadier Molina singled. And then ... JOHN FARRELL TOOK BRANDON WORKMAN OUT OF THE GAME.

AAAHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH

In the top of the inning, Farrell decided that keeping Workman on the mound was of such paramount importance, so critical to his team's chances of winning, that he let him "bat" against Rosenthal, instead of pinch-hitting Mike Napoli and bringing in Uehara. Then in the bottom of the inning, all it took was a one-out single to convince Farrell that Workman no longer offered any value and it was time to use Uehara.

This begs the question: if Farrell was going to remove Workman after just one measly baserunner anyway -- if his leash was that short to begin with -- why was it so important that he remain in the game? If he was willing to use Uehara in the ninth all along, why not pinch-hit for Workman (with Mike Napoli!) and have Uehara start the ninth with a clean inning? There was no logic here. This was a stupendously stupid in-game decision by someone who's being paid millions of dollars by a premier sports franchise to make good in-game decisions.

After the game, Farrell said this:

"In hindsight having Workman bat against Rosenthal was a mismatch."

Wait a second -- you needed hindsight to realize that your pitcher batting against a closer who throws 100 miles per hour was a mismatch???

The Red Sox technically lost Game 3 on a bizarre obstruction call. They really lost it the moment their manager let a pitcher hit in the top of the ninth of a tied game in the World Series -- with a great hitter available to pinch-hit and a great reliever ready to take the mound -- and then removed him from the game anyway after facing just two more hitters. Awful awful awful.

Managers and Mistakes

One of the many quirks of baseball is how little a manager can do to help his team win games. Compared to a sport like football, where coaching is everything, baseball managers don't offer much positive value. Take Joe Maddon off the Rays and they're still a good team; put him on the Padres and they're still a bad team. A manager's most important functions are filling out a lineup card and making pitching changes; the success of those 'strategic' moves are mostly decided by the personnel at his disposal, which a manager does not control. Unless he's batting Delmon Young leadoff, or using Freddy Garcia as an ace reliever, a manager's typical functions don't allow him the opportunity to really hurt the quality of their team.

That's why the collective failures of John Farrell, Don Mattingly, and Fredi Gonzalez on Monday night were so impressive. All three managed to make questionable strategic blunders in their Game 4 matchups, proving that managers really can have a negative impact on their teams -- if you try hard enough.

Mistake 1: John Farrell Gets What He Asked For
Up 2-0 in the best-of-three series, Red Sox manager John Farrell came tantalizingly close to finishing off the Rays in the ALDS on Monday. Game 3 was tied headed into the top of the eighth, and David Ortiz led off the inning with a walk. Farrell decided to pinch-run for Ortiz with Quintin Berry, removing Ortiz from the game. This wasn't a bad decision on its own -- Farrell was playing for the go-ahead run, and Berry is one of the best base-stealers around. In fact, he stole second (though possibly helped by a blown call).

After a groundout, intentional walk, and a strikeout, Stephen Drew was due up with two outs and runners on first and second. Jake McGee, a lefty, was on the mound. Drew has been miserable against lefties this season -- a .196 average and .246 OBP. Fortunately, Farrell had an option on his bench: Xander Bogaerts, one of the top young prospects in the game, a right-handed hitter who could pinch-hit for Drew and replace him at shortstop. But Farrell didn't use him. Drew popped out, ending the inning. Farrell gave up Ortiz for the rest of the game in a gamble to try and score the go-ahead run, but by letting Drew hit against a lefty, he compromised his chances of scoring that run. Why is Bogaerts on the postseason roster if Farrell isn't going to use him in that situation?

The strangeness of that decision was compounded by another one an inning later. The Rays had grabbed a 4-3 lead, so the Red Sox were down to their last three outs in the top of the ninth facing Rays closer Fernando Rodney. The inning began with a five-pitch walk to Will Middlebrooks and a single by Jacoby Ellsbury, putting the tying and go-ahead runs on base. Rodney's control was iffy -- six of his first seven pitches were balls. But then Shane Victorino laid down a bunt, moving the runners over to second and third. If John Farrell instructed Victorino to bunt, then it's absolutely fair to question his judgment.

Because Farrell had already removed his cleanup hitter Ortiz, Boston's chances of winning an extended extra inning game weren't good, especially since they were on the road. The Red Sox should have been trying to win the game in the ninth by scoring multiple runs in the inning. They were in a great situation to do just that, with two runners on, good speed on the bases, a shaky Rodney on the mound, and Shane Victorino and Dustin Pedroia due up. Instead, Farrell chose to give away Victorino's at-bat to play for one run. Even though Victorino isn't a double play risk; even though he's been awesome against right-handed pitching; even though Rodney hadn't yet proven he could actually throw a strike.

Victorino bunted the runners over and a Pedroia ground-out did get that tying run home. But the winning run was stranded when pinch-hitter Mike Carp (batting at the DH spot where Ortiz would have been, mind you) struck out. And the Rays won the game on Jose Lobaton's walk-off in the bottom of the inning.

John Farrell asked for one run. He got exactly one run. Unsurprisingly, he also got a loss.

Mistake 2: Don Mattingly's Bunt Fetish
There might not be any manager in baseball who likes to bunt more than Dodgers manager Don Mattingly. Hopefully, the 8th inning of Monday's Game 4 against the Atlanta Braves will teach him a lesson. (Spoiler: it won't.)

Entering the top of the eighth inning, things were looking pretty grim for the Dodgers. Sure, they were up 2-1 in the series, but they were also trailing by a run with six outs to go in Game 4 against a dynamite Braves bullpen. A loss would mean that the Dodgers had wasted a Clayton Kershaw start on short rest against notable zombie Freddy Garcia with a decisive Game 5 looming in Atlanta. Without a doubt, this was a dire situation.

Yasiel Puig provided a spark by leading off the bottom of the eighth with a double. Juan Uribe was due up next ... and Mattingly apparently asked him to bunt Puig over to third. Now, Juan Uribe is no Shane Victorino. He's not a particularly good hitter. But he's above average, which is more than you can say for the guys following Uribe in the lineup: Skip Schumaker and A.J. Ellis. Both are pretty bad hitters. Uribe was clearly the best chance the Dodgers had at scoring the tying run. And Mattingly wanted to throw away that chance to put the game in the hands of Skip Schumaker and A.J. Ellis. Bad idea.

Fortunately, Juan Uribe is a bad bunter. He failed to put the ball in play twice, taking the bunt off the table. And then he crushed a two-run homer, putting the Dodgers on top 4-3 and sending them to the NLCS.

See, John Farrell? Sometimes, when you let your players hit instead of sacrificing them to the God of Bunts, good things happen.

Mistake 3: Fredi Gonzalez Doesn't Budge
This was easily the least forgivable mistake of the three. Farrell and Mattingly's teams were both ahead in their respective series; Gonzalez's Braves were down 2-1, one loss away from the end of their season. His mistake had far more lasting consequences.

Gonzalez was on the other side of that dramatic Uribe home run. His team was up 3-2, needing six more outs to stave off elimination and force a Game 5 in Atlanta. He brought in setup man David Carpenter to pitch the eighth, not a poor decision considering how good he's been this season. But then Puig led off the inning with a double, and suddenly the tying run was on second and the go-ahead run was at the plate. And with the best short-stint pitcher in the world available to him in the bullpen, Fredi Gonzalez never budged from the dugout.

That's amazing if you think about it. The Braves were up a run in the eighth inning of a game they needed to win, and Craig Kimbrel didn't even face a single batter. Kimbrel is the best relief pitcher in baseball. Over the past two seasons combined, he has a 1.11 ERA with 214 strikeouts and just 66 hits allowed in 129.2 innings. David Carpenter is great, but Craig Kimbrel is better, because Craig Kimbrel is the best.

Still, Gonzalez stuck with Carpenter after the leadoff double to Puig. He's shown a willingness to bring in Kimbrel for a four-out save in the past (he did it in Game 2 of this series, in fact). But needing six outs, in an elimination game, with the tying run on second? In that scenario, Gonzalez refused to summon Kimbrel. To reiterate: had the season been on the line with four outs to go, Kimbrel would've been in the game. But with the season on the line with six outs to go, Kimbrel wasn't an option. That rigid stubbornness lost the Braves the game, as Uribe hit the game-winning two-run homer off Carpenter with Kimbrel watching helplessly from the bullpen.

We traditionally think of mistakes as sudden, unwise deviations from an expected course of action. This mistake wasn't that at all. It wasn't a mental lapse or a brain fart. Quite the opposite: Gonzalez actually adhered to the same bullpen routine he's always followed, the same bullpen routine that got him to the playoffs in the first place -- Carpenter in the eighth, Kimbrel in the ninth. And that right there was the problem. Compared to the regular season, the playoffs are a different beast. Elimination games are a completely different beast. Desperate situations require flexibility; they require creativity; they require the willingness to push your best players to their physical limits, like the Dodgers did by starting Clayton Kershaw on three days' rest. The conservative Fredi Gonzalez showed none of those qualities. Instead, all he had was The Plan. And when The Plan went awry, he was left with nothing.

The Red Sox Pay For Saves, Dearly

From 2006 to 2011, the Boston Red Sox never had to worry about the closer position. Across those six years, Jonathan Papelbon saved 219 games with a stellar ERA of 2.30 and nearly five strikeouts for every walk. Across those six seasons, Papelbon was, according to WAR, the most valuable closer in baseball. Yet when he became a free agent, Boston wisely let him walk, letting the Philadelphia Phillies make the mistake of signing a relief pitcher to an outrageous $63 million contract. The Red Sox played the Papelbon situation perfectly -- extracting his best, prime seasons at a reasonable cost, winning a World Series with him in tow, and wishing him farewell almost immediately after he turned 30.

But the search for Papelbon's replacement? That's an entirely different story. The Red Sox have executed three trades for supposedly-elite closers since Papelbon's departure, and completely botched all of them. Here are those trades, conveniently ordered by both chronology and ascending levels of egregiousness:

Trade #1, December 14th, 2011: Red Sox acquired Mark Melancon from the Houston Astros in exchange for Jed Lowrie and a minor leaguer.

This deal may have been the least egregious of the three. However, it does reveal how strongly Boston's front office bought into the mirage that is The Myth of the Closer. Melancon had been a solid, unspectacular reliever for Houston in 2011. A 2.78 ERA in 74.1 innings as a 26-year-old was very nice, but he didn't have much of a track record at all, and his 1.22 WHIP didn't exactly scream dominance. What he did have, though, were saves. Melancon saved 20 games for the 2011 Astros. So when the Red Sox examined him as a trade target, they valued those saves as proof that Melancon could be a shutdown, late-inning reliever. He was a CLOSER. Of course, saves don't tell the whole story. In reality, Melancon was really just a solid middle reliever temporarily thrust into ninth inning duty thanks to the poor quality of the players around him.

Melancon's first four appearances with Boston in April of 2012 were impossibly disastrous. He got six outs and gave up eleven runs. That came out to a 49.50 ERA. He was demoted to the minors on April 18th and didn't return to Boston until June. Not pretty.

To get Melancon, the Red Sox dealt away an injury-prone middle infielder named Jed Lowrie. He's hit a solid .263/.346/.439 with 19 home runs in 142 games since leaving Boston. His WAR during that span has been 2.7. Comparatively, Melancon gave Boston negative-0.5 WAR.

In a vacuum, trading for Mark Melancon is fine. But treating Mark Melancon like an Elite Closer just because he saved some games for the Astros is the furthest thing from 'fine.'

Trade #2, December 28th, 2011: the Red Sox acquired Andrew Bailey and Ryan Sweeney from the Oakland Athletics in exchange for Josh Reddick and two minor leaguers.

Unlike Mark Melancon, Andrew Bailey is an elite reliever. In three seasons as the A's closer, Bailey's ERA was 2.07; his WHIP was 0.95; he struck out exactly 174 batters in 174 innings. Andrew Bailey is a really good pitcher.

But there's a catch: Andrew Bailey can't stay healthy. He had Tommy John surgery way back in 2005 when he was still in college. After throwing 83.1 innings in 2009, he threw only 49 in 2010 and 41.2 in 2011, thanks to a mish-mosh of injuries that included elbow surgery and a forearm strain. Bailey's dominance doesn't mean much when he's sitting on the disabled list half the time.

On paper, Boston's trade for Bailey was excellent because it provided them with another Proven Closer and bumped Melancon back into the eighth inning. The reality: Bailey got hurt, because that's what he does. Thumb surgery limited him to just 15.1 innings last year, and he's already been back on the disabled list this season for biceps inflammation. In just 29.2 career innings with the Red Sox, Bailey has surrendered 15 runs.

The most notable player Boston sent to Oakland in this trade? Outfielder Josh Reddick, who happened to hit 32 homers for the Oakland A's last year and was paid just $510,000 for those services.

Trade #3,  December 26th, 2012: the Red Sox acquired Joel Hanrahan from the Pittsburgh Pirates in exchange for Mark Melancon and three minor leaguers.

Oh goodness. The Melancon and Bailey trades were bad. But this one -- a botched attempt to rectify the mistakes made in Trades #1 and #2 -- really takes the cake.

After their disastrous 2012 season, the Red Sox needed to revamp their bullpen once again given Bailey's injuries and Melancon's struggles. So they decided Melancon was a sunk cost, and cut bait on him, packaging him with some minor league prospects to get Proven Closer Joel Hanrahan from Pittsburgh. In his previous two seasons, Hanrahan had saved 76 games as the Pirates' All-Star closer, striking out a batter per inning over that stretch. In theory, Hanrahan was the safest bet that the Red Sox had acquired. Unlike Melancon, he had a track record of dominance; unlike Bailey, he had a track record of health. But a trend within Hanrahan's numbers told an alarming story that the Red Sox apparently did not heed:

Hanrahan, 2011: 1.83 ERA, 1.05 WHIP, 2.1 walks per nine innings, 1 HR allowed
Hanrahan, 2012: 2.72 ERA, 1.27 WHIP, 5.4 walks per nine innings, 8 HR allowed

Between 2011 and 2012, Hanrahan completely lost his control. No elite reliever can walk over five batters per inning and be successful. It's a minor miracle that his ERA only rose to 2.72 last year. This is not a guy you go out of your way to trade for.

So it was hardly shocking when Hanrahan bombed spectacularly in Boston this season. In 7.1 innings as Boston's "closer," he was an utter disaster: eight runs allowed (including four home runs), six walks, ten hits, two blown saves, and a loss. He went on the disabled list in early May and recently underwent Tommy John surgery, knocking him out for the rest of the season. Between his dismal performance and his elbow injury, it would be amazing if Joel Hanrahan is ever a good reliever again.

Here's the cherry on top of this whole debacle: Mark Melancon, who the Red Sox quickly gave up on to get Hanrahan, has morphed into a dominant reliever in Pittsburgh. As the Pirates' setup man, his ERA is 0.69 in 26 innings. He's struck out 27 batters and walked just one. Should the Red Sox have seen this coming? Maybe. Melancon's first four April appearances for the Red Sox in 2012 were dismal, but he was much better after being recalled from the minors in June. By the end of the season, both his strikeout rate and walk rate had improved compared to his 2011 numbers as an Astro. If the Red Sox were confident enough in Melancon to trade for him in the first place, then giving up on him after 26 innings (of which only two were truly terrible) seems misguided to say the least.

The final tally on these three trades is depressing. Melancon has already been traded away, Bailey is a ticking injury time bomb, and Hanrahan is out for the season. As of today, the Red Sox have extracted a combined 63 mediocre-to-awful innings out of those three closers. In exchange for that underwhelming return, the Red Sox traded away Josh Reddick, Jed Lowrie, Melancon, and a handful of minor leaguers -- all of them young, cheap, and under team control for years to come.

The Red Sox have learned a very simple lesson the hard way: it makes no sense to surrender anything of value for a relief pitcher. As Melancon, Bailey, and Hanrahan have shown, relievers not named Mariano are too volatile and too unpredictable for any decent-sized commitment. But it's not just that. It's also the fact that good relievers are surprisingly easy to come by these days, given the relative ease of the job. The A's replaced Andrew Bailey just by paying Grant Balfour $4 million. The Pirates replaced Joel Hanrahan with 36-year-old journeyman Jason Grilli, who now leads the majors in saves. In Baltimore, Jim Johnson went from a no-name, sinker-balling middle reliever to saving 51 games last year. The Tigers plucked Jose Valverde off his living room couch in April and now he's closing games for one of the best teams in baseball. Heck -- the Tampa Bay Rays got 48 saves out of Fernando Rodney last year.

Yet despite all those examples of teams conjuring elite relievers out of nowhere, the Red Sox felt compelled to pay through the nose for three eminently flawed closers. There's no reason for any team to make those types of costly deals anymore. With the Melancon-Bailey-Hanrahan triple debacle fresh in their minds, it's unlikely that the Red Sox will forget that painful lesson anytime soon.

The Trade, and What It Means

Warning: long-winded rant below

Baseball has never seen a trade like this before. Two of the sport's premier franchises--one hitting reboot on a failed vision, the other gearing up for a new dynasty. Three big-name, high-priced stars. And a quarter of a billion dollars in salary. It even happened in August, which almost never sees any significant trades, making it all the more shocking.

In the history of baseball, only one player with $100 million left on his contract had ever been traded: Alex Rodriguez to the Yankees. Two such players were involved in this deal alone. The Los Angeles Dodgers acquired the nine-digit-salaried Adrian Gonzalez and Carl Crawford, along with Josh Beckett [and Nick Punto, but who cares besides Mrs. Punto] from the Boston Red Sox for five players you've never heard of. In the midst of a pennant race, the revamped and very-rich Dodgers acquired three recognizable stars when anyone could have claimed them on waivers, but didn't. This is the kind of trade that gets vetoed in fantasy baseball leagues.

And yet, in real baseball, the Dodgers were kind of fleeced by the Red Sox.

Let's start at the beginning. The Dodgers did this because they wanted Adrian Gonzalez. Their incumbent first baseman, James Loney, was one of the worst in baseball (.646 OPS and four homers). Gonzalez's OPS is over 200 points better and that sizable upgrade could prove to be the difference in a tight playoff race. The money, obviously, was no object. Gonzalez is actually reasonably paid compared to the Fielders and Pujolses of the world; he's only signed through age 36 and has about $130 million left on his deal. There won't be any better options on the free agent market this offseason, either. Gonzalez is a pretty good value for the next six seasons and a nice target for LA.

But the Red Sox had no incentive to give away Adrian Gonzalez. The Dodgers couldn't offer any players in return that would equal his production. However, the Dodgers could offer the one trade chip that Boston actually needed and couldn't find anywhere else: the ability to absorb bad contracts. So Boston asked LA to take Carl Crawford and Josh Beckett, too.

Those two players are the opposite of desirable. Beckett is owed over $30 million between the next two seasons and will continue to be worth only a tiny fraction of that, even in the NL West. Crawford is even worse. He's still owed more than $100 million over the next five years, through 2017. He just had Tommy John surgery, meaning he's already done for 2012 and will probably miss some of 2013 too. And he's just not good anymore, as his .260/.292/.419 line with the Red Sox indicates. He's bad, getting older, and drastically overpaid. This might be the worst contract in baseball. The Sox front office probably thought they would never be able to unload it.

So the Red Sox jumped at the opportunity for a trade. They attached the toxic Crawford and Beckett contracts to Gonzalez's hip, demanding that the Dodgers take both in any deal for Gonzalez. They understood that they were killing Gonzalez's trade value. They understood that they wouldn't get much in return from the Dodgers for their stud first baseman. They were okay with it. They just wanted Crawford, Beckett, and their contracts off the books more than anything.

Except: unexpectedly, the Dodgers did give the Red Sox something valuable in return.

They actually surrendered a five-player package for Gonzalez, Crawford, Beckett, and Punto. And at least three of those players might have significant value down the road.

The first of these players is Jerry Sands, a 24-year-old first baseman/outfielder who has destroyed minor league pitching in his career. Maybe he can't hit major league pitching and becomes Matt LaPorta, but maybe he becomes a useful platoon player.

The second player is 22-year-old right-hander Allen Webster, currently in Double-A. The prospect guys rank him as one of the three or four best pitching prospects in the Dodgers' farm system and give him the ceiling of a #2 or #3 starter in the majors.

The third player is 23-year-old right-hander Rubby de la Rosa, who might be ready to pitch in the majors next year. Like Webster, he has the ceiling of a mid-rotation starter when healthy.

Why did the Dodgers have to give up these players? (I understand Sands, because he now has no position with LA, but not Webster and de la Rosa.) In addition to assuming the $130 million on Gonzalez's contract, the Dodgers are essentially mailing 130 million additional dollars to the Red Sox by freeing them of Crawford and Beckett. That seems like enough of a payment to get Gonzalez (who, it shouldn't be forgotten, isn't exactly cheap, is declining into his 30's, and went unclaimed by all American League teams on waivers for those reasons). Nope. The Dodgers were just desperate.

The Red Sox, meanwhile, came out of this blockbuster extremely well. They freed up $250 million. They dumped players who were rumored of being insubordinate. They rid themselves of two onerous contracts and still got back some potentially valuable pieces. Losing Gonzalez hurts, but he's not irreplaceable. The Red Sox may not make the playoffs in 2013. But now their long-term situation looks a lot brighter. They can go a lot of different ways. Sign Jacoby Ellsbury to an extension that might not have been possible with Crawford on the payroll? Trade him for more pitching? Sign Michael Bourn in free agency? See what young guys like Ryan Kalish and Jerry Sands have to offer? The Sox got a mulligan on a few very bad decisions that were thought irreversible just last week. New management now has a chance to bid the Theo Epstein era a final farewell and give this team a new vision.

Meanwhile, the Dodgers made themselves better in the short-term with this trade. But unlike the Hanley Ramirez trade, which was fantastic, I think they overpaid. They'll feel the repercussions down the road. They weakened their farm system; they traded away potentially two above-average starters; they assumed a quarter-of-a-billion dollars in payroll for a good first baseman and two expensive lottery tickets. Their payroll for next year is already up to almost $190 million. In 2017, they'll have over $80 million invested in just four players: Gonzalez, Crawford, Matt Kemp, and Andre Ethier. That could look very very ugly. This outlook doesn't even include an extension for ace Clayton Kershaw, which will surely be very expensive, too.

The counter-argument to this would be "But the Dodgers are literally bathing in cash now!!" Sure. But just because you have $250 million lying around doesn't mean that you get a free pass for spending it unwisely. Is buying Adrian Gonzalez, Carl Crawford, and Josh Beckett really the BEST way to spend $250 million in baseball today? How about buying those three players, and giving up useful prospects in the process?

This trade is truly one-of-a-kind. One team added three name-brand superstars and bolstered itself for a playoff run. The other team admitted defeat in 2012, blew up its roster, and didn't get any good players back. And the winner isn't who you think it is.

Lefty/Righty Doesn't Really Matter

Old-school managers feel a compulsive need to alternate right-handed and left-handed hitters in their lineups. Theoretically, this makes the late innings difficult to navigate for the opposing manager, who must micromanage his bullpen arms to get the match-ups he wants.

Sometimes, this obsession with lefty-righty lineup symmetry goes too far and actually hurts a team's scoring expectancy. The relevant example here lies with Mike Scioscia's Angels. Scioscia's middle-of-the-order bats are Albert Pujols and Mark Trumbo, but both are righties, so for much of the season Scioscia felt compelled to separate the two with switch-hitter Kendrys Morales. This is despite the fact that Trumbo is hitting a Josh Hamilton-like .309/.361/.630 with 26 homers, while Morales' power has disappeared en route to a .423 slugging percentage and 9 home runs. Only recently did Scioscia relent and move Trumbo into his rightful cleanup spot behind Pujols, finally allowing the two righties to hit back-to-back (oh, the humanity!). The improvement won't be enormous, but one would expect the Angels to score more runs with their best hitters now concentrated together in the lineup.

Bobby Valentine of the Red Sox, meanwhile, has none of Scioscia's qualms about putting same-side hitters next to each other. On Monday against the White Sox, he actually had four straight lefties lead off his lineup: Jacoby Ellsbury, Carl Crawford, David Ortiz, and Adrian Gonzalez. In the bottom of the seventh inning of a 1-1 tie, White Sox manager Robin Ventura pulled his right-handed starter with those four lefties due up next, predictably bringing in a left-handed reliever, Leyson Septimo. And what happened?

Crawford walked. Ortiz walked. Adrian Gonzalez homered. 4-1 Red Sox. They won the game. Sometimes, good hitters are just good hitters, regardless of theoretical platoon disadvantages.

Since lineup construction has a very small impact over the course of a long season, it doesn't matter THAT much whether managers choose to prioritize lefty-righty matchups or just plain production. But as a rule of thumb, bunching your best hitters together in the lineup, regardless of right- or left-handedness, is probably the better way to go.

Daniel Bard Gets Joba'd

With Sunday night's Yankees-Red Sox game rained out, the Red Sox have decided to skip Daniel Bard's start rather than push it back to Monday. The Red Sox have also decided that, despite his early progress as a starter, Bard will be available to pitch out of the beleaguered bullpen before his next start.

And so begins the Joba Chamberlain-ing of Daniel Bard. Knee-Jerk Reaction, thy name is Red Sox Front Office.

The Bobby Valentine's Day Massacre

The Red Sox continue to redefine just exactly where 'rock bottom' is. Right when you think things can't possibly get any worse--they do. And then some.

Just 14 games in, Bobby Valentine is already
persona non grata in Red Sox Nation.

Boston's epic loss to the Yankees on April 21st, 2012 (deemed the 'Bobby Valentine's Day Massacre' on Twitter) is the perfect example. The Red Sox jumped all over an ineffective Freddy Garcia, chasing him from the game before he could get six outs. Between a few more runs off the Yankees' bullpen and an excellent start from homegrown fourth starter Felix Doubront, the Sox built up a 9-0 lead in the sixth inning. The game was over.

And then it wasn't. A solo home run by Mark Teixeira effectively ended Doubront's day. In the seventh inning, a Nick Swisher grand slam and a Teixeira three-run homer cut the deficit to one. And the Yankees pushed across seven more runs in the eighth when Swisher, Teixeira, and Russell Martin each had 2-RBI doubles and Mike Aviles simply fell down on a Derek Jeter ground ball (epitomizing Boston's disastrous day). Over this stretch, 18 of 21 Yankees reached base (for an .857 OBP). The final was 15-9. The Win Expectancy Chart, depicting the odds of victory for each side as the game progressed, looked like this:

Thanks to a bunch of factors, Saturday's $175 million team featured an outfield of Darnell McDonald, Cody Ross, and Ryan Sweeney, two pinch-hitters named Nate Spears and Nick Punto, and a bullpen that sent out Vincente Padilla, Matt Albers, Franklin Morales, Alfredo Aceves, Justin Thomas, and Junichi Tazawa. Between Jacoby Ellsbury, Carl Crawford, Andrew Bailey, John Lackey, and Daisuke Matsuzaka, the Sox have over $60 million sitting on the DL, totaling more than the entire payrolls of a half-dozen other teams. All of this lies in stark contrast to the Yankees, who countered the injury to their left fielder by bringing Andruw Jones, Raul Ibanez, and Eduardo Nunez off the bench, and whose bullpen held the Sox scoreless over the final four innings even when their two best relievers were unavailable.

Theo Epstein and Terry Francona:
"Wow, didn't we used to win with this team??"

This has been business as usual for the Red Sox since the end of last year. Actually, their troubles can be precisely traced back to another Fenway series against the Yankees, this one in late August of 2011. They entered that series 82-52, in first place in the AL East. But in the deciding contest of that three-game set, Russell Martin hit a 2-RBI double off of Daniel Bard in the 7th inning that eventually won the Yankees the game.

Ever since that loss, the Red Sox have won exactly one series. Their record over that period is 11-28. They've said goodbye to core pieces of their previous identity: Theo Epstein, Terry Francona, Jonathan Papelbon, Jason Varitek, Tim Wakefield, Marco Scutaro, and J.D. Drew. Their staff's 2012 ERA is 6.10, easily the worst in baseball. Imported closer Andrew Bailey is out past the All-Star break. Imported setup man Mark Melancon is in Pawtucket, and based on how they're hitting, Kevin Youkilis and Jarrod Saltalamacchia should be there too. GM Ben Cherington just acquired Marlon Byrd from Theo Epstein's Cubs; Byrd is the owner of a .070 batting average this year. Manager Bobby Valentine is being avidly booed. The 100th anniversary of Fenway was spoiled by a New York home run barrage. And Boston can't even call Saturday's 15-9 loss the worst of the week, thanks to an 18-3 beatdown at the hands of the Texas Rangers on Tuesday.

So even though it's been said countless times over the past few months, it's being said again: things can't possibly get any worse. For the sanity of Red Sox Nation, the Bobby Valentine's Day Massacre must finally and mercifully represent rock bottom for this tortured team. On Sunday, they'll try to salvage the final game of this Yankees series with Daniel Bard facing off against C.C. Sabathia. A win or a loss won't decide Boston's season. But given how things have been going lately, it sure seems like the Sox need something--anything--to grab onto for dear life.

The Worst Slide of All Time

Courtesy of Kelly Shoppach, catcher for the Boston Red Sox:

MLB Season Preview: Boston Red Sox

After last season's collapse, Boston's roster remains very top-heavy, but there's enough here to win the AL East.

Dustin Pedroia is the smallest and scrappiest of all
the small and scrappy middle infielders.

Offense: The Red Sox scored the most runs in the majors last season, and they'll challenge for that spot again thanks to four elite hitters at the top of the lineup. Jacoby Ellsbury may never hit 32 homers again, but he and Dustin Pedroia are elite combinations of power, speed, and patience. Adrian Gonzalez could win the MVP now that he's another year removed from shoulder surgery. And David Ortiz seems impervious to the effects of age. After that, things get a little dicey. Kevin Youkilis has to stay healthy at third base (he's averaged 111 games played over the last two seasons). Carl Crawford will try to prove that 2011 was a one-time nightmare (.255 average, 18 steals), but he's still dealing with a wrist injury. Shortstop is a black hole after Marco Scutaro and Jed Lowrie were traded this offseason, so Mike Aviles will likely see the most time there, unless slick-fielding Cuban prospect Jose Iglesias proves he can actually hit. Right field will be some combination of Ryan Sweeney and Ryan Kalish (once he recovers from injury), and catcher will be some combination of Jarrod Saltalamacchia, Kelly Shoppach, and perhaps rookie Ryan Lavarnway. Meh. The bottom of the order isn't exactly stacked, but thanks to the top four guys, it doesn't really have to be.

Jon Lester and Josh Beckett enjoy pitching almost
as much as they enjoy fried chicken and beer.

Pitching: Like the offense, the Red Sox' pitching staff is top-heavy. Jon Lester has put together four straight seasons of at least 190 innings and sub-3.50 ERAs. Josh Beckett will likely get hurt at some point, but he's still effective when healthy (2.89 ERA in 2011). After Beckett, it again gets dicey pretty quickly. Clay Buchholz has thrown 100 innings once in his career, and missed most of last season with back woes. The 4 and 5 spots in the rotation are up for grabs, with the favorites being converted reliever Alfredo Aceves and unproven rookie Felix Doubront. Flamethrowing set-up man Daniel Bard didn't impress as a starter in spring (with an ERA over 7.00) so he may return to the bullpen. There are other veteran options, like Aaron Cook, Vincente Padilla, and eventually Daisuke Matsuzaka, but none of those names inspire much confidence. At least the bullpen remains above average: Jonathan Papelbon is in Philadelphia, but Andrew Bailey and Mark Melancon were added to a unit that could also include Bard or Aceves.

The lesser-known King Felix.

Breakout Candidates: Bard was supposed to be this year's version of Alexi Ogando or C.J. Wilson, but his spring struggles have changed that. Instead, Felix Doubront could be the one who thrives in the Red Sox rotation if given the chance. He doesn't have much left to prove in the minors (over 600 innings pitched there) and he's enjoyed an excellent spring. Offensively, Ryan Lavarnway could surprise behind the plate thanks to above-average power.

3 Key Questions: Who settles in at the back of the rotation? Will a position player step up at catcher, right field, and shortstop? And is Carl Crawford really this bad?

Best Case Scenario: The starters stay healthy, the offense stays elite, Carl Crawford doesn't suck, Roy Oswalt signs midseason, and the Red Sox are world champions.

Worst Case Scenario: Beckett and Buchholz get hurt, the bottom of the lineup is miserable, Carl Crawford continues to suck, Vincente Padilla gets 15 starts, and Red Sox fans are actually heard saying, "At least we get Lackey back next year" as they watch the Yankees win the World Series.

Predicted Finish: The Sox could easily win the division. But they don't have the pitching depth of the Rays or Yankees, and the lineup is shallower than in years past.