As summer approaches, one of baseball's biggest stories will be Stephen Strasburg's so-called innings limit. The dominant 23-year-old right-hander is coming off a 2011 season in which he threw only 24 big-league innings thanks to recovery from the Tommy John surgery he had the year before. Though he's regained his form spectacularly, the Nationals are going to limit his workload in some way to protect the health of their ace. Seems rather straightforward. Yet Howard Bryant wrote a long, baffling article on the subject for ESPN.com that manages to drum up controversy where it doesn't really exist. His words in bold:
"...The Nationals are now in first place and have been the fashionable pick to challenge for the NL East since the end of last season. Yet, in a stunningly nonsensical development, Nationals management, GM Mike Rizzo in particular, will limit Stephen Strasburg, the team's best pitcher and the No. 1 overall pick in the 2009 draft, to 160 innings this season whether the Nationals are in first place, fighting in a September pennant race or need him for a one-game playoff. On his present schedule, Strasburg would be shut down Sept. 8, just as the lights to baseball's big stage go on."
Right off the bat, just to be clear, this is exactly what Nationals GM Mike Rizzo said about the Strasburg situation a few days ago:
"I don't have a specific pitch count in my mind, a specific innings count in my mind. I am going to refer to my experience as a farm director, as a player development guy, and knowing his body. In conjunction with Davey Johnson and (pitching coach) Steve McCatty, when we feel he's had enough, we're going to shut him down."
So you can throw that 160 innings number and that Sept. 8 date right out the window, because not even the GM knows exactly how much work Strasburg will get before he's shut down.
"The reason for this apparent caution is the season-ending elbow surgery Strasburg suffered in his rookie season of 2010. The Nationals, or so goes the narrative, are protecting a young player's career, taking the long view, acting responsibly."
I love how this is written sarcastically, as if protecting a young player's career, 'taking the long view' (not a thing real people say), and acting responsibly are undesirable goals.
"Though Rizzo and the Nationals have yet to explain exactly why and how 160 innings became the failsafe number that would protect Strasburg from injury..."
Perhaps because Rizzo and the Nationals haven't actually
chosen this 160 number you keep referring to?
"...The number 160 looks responsible enough, containing the heft of about 25 starts but is not so burdensome that anyone would mistake Nationals manager Davey Johnson for arm-killing Joe Torre."
160:
not the number that has been set. No number has been set. This cannot be stressed enough.
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The problem is that injuries cannot really be managed or predicted, for the human arm was designed to throw underhand (see: softball, fast-pitch) not overhand, and certainly not roughly 90 miles per hour 3,500 times a year (not including spring training, side work, warm-ups and playoffs)."
So, because we can't really manage or predict injuries, we shouldn't try to prevent them at all? Forget about keeping track of pitch counts! Let pitchers throw 140 times per start and 350 innings per season! Sure, everyone's arm will fall off, but according to Howard Bryant, that was bound to happen anyway. Might as well extract as much value from a pitcher as possible before the inevitable. Maybe the Nats can get two fine seasons out of Strasburg before his right arm is amputated.
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Strasburg was a pitching prototype, big and strong, powered by his legs, owner of a 97-mph fastball with the kind of power mechanics that made pitching coaches salivate. The Nationals did everything right, limiting his minor league innings, keeping him on a tight pitching schedule when he came to the big leagues in 2010, only to see him blow out his elbow after all of 68 1/3 innings."
Strasburg was always the best, but one thing he
wasn't was a pitching prototype. The big knock against Strasburg was the worry that his pitching motion would eventually lead to Tommy John surgery. That's exactly what happened. You can't use that to debunk the merits of the Nationals' cautious approach.
"A couple of years earlier, Boston Red Sox right-hander Daisuke Matsuzaka went 18-3 in 167 2/3 innings (the lowest number of innings in baseball history a starting pitcher threw to achieve that win total). Despite, the light, Strasburg-projected workload, an undisclosed hip injury limited Matsuzaka to 59 1/3 innings in 2009 (after he also pitched in the World Baseball Classic that spring). He pitched 153 2/3 in 2010 and 37 1/3 innings last year, before he required Tommy John surgery on his elbow. He is scheduled to return this month."
So, because this one dude named Daisuke needed Tommy John surgery that one time, protecting Stephen Strasburg--who has already had one Tommy John surgery--is a futile endeavor. That makes loads of sense.
Meanwhile, let's not bother to mention the fact that Matsuzaka had to adjust from the Japanese style of pitching once a week to MLB's once-every-five-days routine. That increase in workload doesn't fit Bryant's narrative, so we should just ignore it.
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The greatest con in baseball over the past 20 years has been the elevation of the general managers. While fans still scream about firing managers, the GM's influence and salaries have risen while scrutiny of their decisions and of their accomplishment has diminished."
Not sure how this is going to fit with the rest of your article, but anyway: could not disagree more. What sport are you following? As the influence and salaries of GMs have increased, so has the scrutiny and criticism in this Information Age where every insignificant roster move is picked apart by the cyber wolves.
"The deification of the general manager follows the similarly disturbing trends of an overreliance on statistics as well as the lack of accountability demanded of front offices and others in power."
No general managers have been deified, except perhaps Theo Epstein and Billy Beane (and there's been much less of that recently on both of those fronts). In fact, it's far more likely for a GM to be
villified than respected. Hard to argue that there's a lack of accountability in that environment.
And that was a nice drive-by shot at statistics. God forbid GMs develop a reliance on numbers, which merely record every event that occurs in a baseball game in an effort to quantify performance. Useless symbols, those.
"The Red Sox won two World Series under his watch, but Theo Epstein was perhaps the worst general manager in history at signing free agents, eclipsed only by Jim Hendry, the man he replaced in Chicago. In New York, Brian Cashman has spent $1.8 billion in payroll over the past decade yet has won exactly as many championships in that time as the Miami Marlins."
Seems like this is going off-topic, but I'll bite. In Epstein's eight seasons with the Sox, he won two championships and made the playoffs five times. In Cashman's fourteen seasons with the Yankees, he has won four championships and made the playoffs thirteen times. They've competed against each other in the toughest division in baseball yet have consistently put together some of the game's best teams.
The Marlins, for what it's worth, are one of the greatest all-time flukes. They've made the playoffs just twice in their 19-year history, yet won the World Series both times. Someone needs to look into how that happened.
"The truth is, despite receiving the Hollywood treatment from Brad Pitt, the general manager today is a better-paid bureaucrat. Some are better at evaluating young talent than others; others are better at spotting free agents. None held to the accountability standard of players or managers."
General managers are entrusted with running multi-million dollar enterprises that draw millions of fans each year. Managers and players commit mistakes on a daily basis; GMs can get fired for just a couple bad ones. Of course they're held accountable. This is so off-topic.
"All profit from the false currency of important-sounding phrases like 'sample size.'"
A phrase like sample size sounds important because, yeah, it's important. Maybe Theo Epstein should've ignored the minuscule sample size and traded Dustin Pedroia after he hit .191 in his first 89 at-bats.
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Cashman and the Yankees sounded wise and smart and responsible with the infamous "Joba Rules" to protect the career of Joba Chamberlain, but he has never pitched 160 inning yet still needed Tommy John surgery on his elbow after 28 2/3 innings last year."
It's fair to say that the lack of minor league innings and the constant indecision about his role were responsible for Chamberlain's injury. Not the stupid Joba Rules. I'm losing sight of where this article is going.
"The more constructive baseball minds watch their pitchers closely for signs that something is wrong and then determine why, not arbitrarily when, to intervene with a pitcher."
Wow, and here I thought that's exactly what Mike Rizzo is doing with Stephen Strasburg. Oh wait--
that's exactly what Mike Rizzo is doing with Stephen Strasburg.
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Neither Zimmermann nor Strasburg was injured due to heavy workload. Neither injury has been attributed to overuse: both pitchers had thrown fewer than 70 innings when their injuries occurred. Statistics have their place in the game, just as the game has its place without statistics, but Rizzo's logic seems more geared toward keeping up the appearance of being diligent."
On the one hand, Bryant is arguing for a less conservative method of handling young pitchers. On the other hand, he's mounting a crusade against statistics, sample size, and the modern GM. How are these things related in any way?
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As their ill-conceived idea has been questioned, Johnson and Rizzo can't agree on the same message. Rizzo has since said Strasburg isn't on an innings count -- even though he said as early as last summer he had already calculated the innings limit in his head, while Johnson says Strasburg's innings for 2012 have already been determined."
The idea just
isn't ill-conceived. In 2010, Strasburg threw 123.1 professional innings, then underwent Tommy John surgery. In 2011, he threw just 44.1 professional innings after the rehab process was over. Throwing 200 innings this season would represent a massive increase over the previous two years, a potentially-hurtful amount of stress on an arm that was recently surgically repaired. Meanwhile, the Nationals used the 160-inning limit on Jordan Zimmermann last year after his Tommy John experience, and he's been plugging away in 2012 without any worries. What's the problem?
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All of this, of course, is nonsense, simply the illusion of responsibility for the sake of appearances."
That's completely ludicrous. I'm pretty sure that any attempt to keep Stephen Strasburg from ending up like Mark Prior is anything but nonsense.
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If the Nationals actually go through a magical summer and the city of Washington has a chance to experience playoff baseball for the first time since the Dust Bowl, Strasburg the ace should pitch when needed. If he doesn't, fans should line up and pay for something else (there's this kid, Robert Griffin III, who will be in the area) and the city should demand a $611 million refund -- in cash -- from the Nationals for building a stadium for a team that isn't trying to win, and especially for a front office that prefers looking smart to actually being smart."
Sorry, but there's only one scenario where Washington's fans have a right to demand a $611 million refund: if Strasburg's arm falls off because the Nationals listened to Howard Bryant.
