How They Did It: The 2012 New York Yankees

If there was ever a year where the Yankees seemed vulnerable, it was 2012. Not only did an old team get one year older, they lost two of their key young players (Brett Gardner and Michael Pineda) for the season and saw numerous others fall to injury, including the great Mariano Rivera. But at the end of the season, the Yankees ended up right where they always expect to be: at the top of the AL East, and playing in the ALCS for a shot at another World Series title. What were the keys to surviving the adversity?

1. A Home-Run-Hitting Offense: Hitting home runs is relatively easy to do at Yankee Stadium, and that's how the home team built their offense. Only Robinson Cano and Derek Jeter hit for a high average but amazingly, ten different Yankees hit at least 14 home runs. They were paced by Curtis Granderson's 43, and he now has the most home runs in baseball over the past two seasons. This Yankees hit the most home runs in the majors and therefore scored the second-most runs.

2. Strong Starting Pitching: Though it wasn't healthy for much of the season, the Yankees had one of their best starting rotations in recent memory. C.C. Sabathia's "down" year featured 200 innings, a 3.38 ERA, and the best strikeout-to-walk ratio in the AL. Hiroki Kuroda's transition from the NL West to Yankee Stadium went seamlessly (a 3.32 ERA in 219.2 innings). Andy Pettitte only threw 75 innings, but they were excellent and he got healthy in time for the stretch run. And Phil Hughes, independent of the unfair expectations heaped upon him, had the best season of his career. Despite pitching in a bandbox, these four starters were consistently excellent.

3. Depth: With their resources, the Yankees were able to cover for a lot of the injuries a veteran team tends to suffer. When longtime closer Mariano Rivera went down, Rafael Soriano stepped in to save 42 games with an ERA of 2.26. Andy Pettitte and C.C. Sabathia both spent time on the DL, but they were adequately filled in for by rookie David Phelps and veteran Freddy Garcia. When Alex Rodriguez broke his hand, Eric Chavez took over and put up a .281/.348/.496 line. The loss of Brett Gardner opened the door for Raul Ibanez, who slugged 19 home runs and enjoyed some ridiculously clutch moments. It also led to the midseason acquisition of Ichiro Suzuki, who hit .322 for his new team. All of these extra pieces helped the Yankees stay flexible through tough times.

4. Veterans: Teams that rely on contributions from young players can sometimes get ambushed by wild fluctuations in their performance, and not always for the better. On the other hand, the likes of Sabathia, Kuroda, Robinson Cano, Nick Swisher, Mark Teixeira, and Derek Jeter have been some of the most consistent and durable players in baseball over the last few years despite their ages (only Cano is under 30). Even the aging and much-ridiculed Alex Rodriguez was productive in the regular season: his OPS was just .008 points lower than Derek Jeter's. Funny how no one ever mentions that.

5. Strikeouts and Walks: Yankees hitters and pitchers controlled the strike zone perhaps better than any other team. Their pitchers had the second-best strikeout-to-walk ratio in baseball. Their hitters had the third-most walks in baseball but were in the bottom ten in strikeouts despite hitting for so much power. This was one of the more disciplined teams in the league that rarely gave up an at-bat easily.

When it comes to roster construction for the Yankees, obviously financial power is the biggest factor. The Yankees have had the highest payroll in baseball for a long time now. Their cornerstone players (ace, first baseman, third baseman, closer) all left small-market teams as free agents to sign massive free agent contracts in New York.

A high payroll not only helps to bring in elite free agents; it also keeps homegrown stars around for their whole careers. The Yankees can afford to pay the likes of Derek Jeter, Andy Pettitte, and Mariano Rivera whatever they agree upon to keep playing for New York. They were able to give the next star in line, Robinson Cano, a nice contract at a young age and they have the money to keep him around long-term, too.

However, the Yankees front office has also made acquisitions that any other team could have made, regardless of resources. Many were of the buy-low variety, like trades for Nick Swisher and Curtis Granderson after they each had down seasons; both have improved in New York. The Yankees also grabbed Russell Martin off the scrap heap and signed veterans that few wanted like Raul Ibanez, Eric Chavez, and Andruw Jones, all of them dirt-cheap, and all have provided excellent value. And the Yankees were the ones who snagged Hiroki Kuroda on a bargain one-year deal, certainly a contract that other teams could have afforded. It's tempting to attribute New York's success solely to the financial advantage. But the teams has made some shrewd moves that had nothing to do with a $200 million payroll. That's been a big part of the strategy that won the Yankees three AL East titles--and a championship--in the last four seasons.

New York's Formula: Good starting pitching, a disciplined home-run-hitting offense, and a deep roster, achieved through a high payroll and buy-low acquisitions.

Oakland's Formula: Young pitching depth, dominant bullpen, and a platooning lineup built on speed, power, and defense, achieved through smart trades and a deep minor league system.

Detroit's Formula: Good starting pitching and an elite top of the lineup, achieved through the acquisition of elite players by any means.

San Francisco's Formula: Healthy starting pitching, dominant bullpen, and a lineup built for home-field advantage achieved through strong pitching development and the revitalization of declining veterans' careers.

Washington's Formula: Healthy and elite starting pitching, dominant bullpen, and balanced lineup achieved through homegrown talent and superb talent evaluation.

Cincinnati's Formula: Healthy starting pitching, dominant bullpen, and balanced lineup achieved through homegrown talent and low payroll.

How They Did It: The 2012 Oakland Athletics

While everyone's attention was focused on Baltimore's shocking ascension in the East, the Athletics were busy making an even-more-stunning push in the West. No one expected anything of Oakland thanks to who they were chasing in their division: the high-payroll and big-expectation teams in Los Angeles and Texas. Despite being 13 games back at one point in June, the A's hosted a walk-off win party in July, pulled to within five games with nine to play, and swept the Rangers in the final series of the season to win the AL West title. Where did this come from?

1. Pitching Depth: Especially young pitching depth. The A's had three veteran starters, but Brett Anderson only made six starts due to injury, Brandon McCarthy was hit in the head by a line drive, and Bartolo Colon was suspended for PED use. So during the final month of the season, Oakland surpassed Texas with a five-man rookie rotation: offseason trade acquisitions Tommy Milone and Jarrod Parker, 29-year-old journeyman Travis Blackley, and out-of-nowhere minor league studs A.J. Griffin and Dan Straily. Helped by Oakland Coliseum's friendly dimensions, none of those starters posted an ERA over 4.00. Not many organizations have five rookie starters good enough to pitch in the majors, let alone lead a club to the playoffs.

2. Strong Bullpen: In the final series against Texas, the A's knew exactly what their formula was once they got a lead: their trio of bullpen aces. The first was Sean Doolittle, a hard-throwing lefty who was a minor league first baseman this time last year. The second was Ryan Cook, another rookie acquired over the offseason who was briefly Oakland's closer and put up a 2.09 ERA. And the ninth belonged to Grant Balfour, the elder statesman of the group (34 years old) who locked down all of Oakland's key victories. The trio protected late leads in all three games against the Rangers.

3. Platooning Offense: Stuck in a massive ballpark without the funds to acquire big-money power hitters, the A's turned to a more efficient method of improving the offense: platooning. Timeshares existed at first base (Chris Carter and Brandon Moss), DH (Johnny Gomes and Seth Smith), and catcher (Derek Norris and George Kottaras). The A's were thus able to make up for their lack of stars by getting the best possible production out of each player while hiding their weaknesses.

4. Speed and Power: The Athletics set an American League record for most team strikeouts. But they made up for their collective failure to put the ball in play by staying aggressive on the basepaths and hitting the ball out of the park. Eight different A's players hit double-digit home runs (led by Josh Reddick's 32), and five stole double-digit bases (led by Coco Crisp's 39). Yoenis Cespedes, signed as a free agent out of Cuba, did both, hitting 23 homers and stealing 16 bases.

5. Good Defense: One of the things that really helped Oakland's young pitching staff was the solid defense behind them. Speedsters Coco Crisp and Yoenis Cespedes roamed the outfield, along with Josh Reddick, who kept opposing baserunners honest with one of the best arms in baseball. The infield defense was questionable for much of the season, but then the A's traded for Stephen Drew. He plugged a hole at shortstop and allowed the incumbent, Cliff Pennington, to move over to second, thus improving at both positions.

As unlikely as the success of the Orioles was, they at least had a strong foundation to work with: Adam Jones, Matt Wieters, J.J. Hardy, and so forth. The A's had nothing: they actually traded away their foundation prior to the season when they dealt five pitchers, including the closer and two staff aces, for a flock of faceless unproven rookies.

Yet one huge reason for Oakland's rise was the instant success of those unproven rookies. In exchange for the five pitchers they dealt away, the A's received their Game 1 and Game 2 playoff starters, their team leader in home runs, half of their DH and catcher platoons, and their setup man. It's crazy to think that so many minor leaguers--who are usually no more than lottery tickets--could all perform so highly for a division champion so quickly. The A's made sure to maximize their return in all their trades.

The second important reason for the A's success was their minor league depth, which provided contingency plans when certain things weren't working out. Starting first baseman Daric Barton has one home run? He was replaced by career minor leaguers Brandon Moss and Chris Carter, who combined to hit 37. Starting catcher Kurt Suzuki is hitting .218? He was traded to the Nationals mid-summer and replaced by disciplined minor leaguer Derek Norris. Jemile Weeks isn't hitting at second base? The A's had the depth to acquire Stephen Drew and shore up the middle infield. No one's hitting at third base? Josh Donaldson was summoned from Triple-A in August, and he hit .290 the rest of the way. Injuries strike the rotation? Up from the minors came Dan Straily and A.J. Griffin and Travis Blackley, all of whom performed admirably. The A's weren't stuck with under-performing players because they had the depth to either replace them from within or make a trade. That ability to adjust on the fly and make up for the shortcomings of a low payroll proved instrumental to Oakland's unlikely AL West title.

Oakland's Formula: Young pitching depth, dominant bullpen, and a platooning lineup built on speed, power, and defense, achieved through smart trades and a deep minor league system.

Detroit's Formula: Good starting pitching and an elite top of the lineup, achieved through the acquisition of elite players by any means.

San Francisco's Formula: Healthy starting pitching, dominant bullpen, and a lineup built for home-field advantage achieved through strong pitching development and the revitalization of declining veterans' careers.

Washington's Formula: Healthy and elite starting pitching, dominant bullpen, and balanced lineup achieved through homegrown talent and superb talent evaluation.

Cincinnati's Formula: Healthy starting pitching, dominant bullpen, and balanced lineup achieved through homegrown talent and low payroll.

How They Did It: The 2012 Detroit Tigers

Everyone thought it would be easy sledding for the Tigers this season. They had run away with the division last year, and they added Prince Fielder to an already-potent lineup. As it turns out, the Tigers had an up-and-down season and trailed the Chicago White Sox for most of the summer. But they got hot at the right time and overtook Chicago in the last two weeks, clinching the AL Central for the second consecutive season. The Tigers haven't been a very good team for most of the year, so how did they stay in the race and then pounce at the exact right time?

1. The Top of the Lineup: Miguel Cabrera was obviously the engine that drove this offense thanks to an OPS over 1.000 and 44 home runs. He also got help from two key parts of the lineup. One was the leadoff spot, thanks to Austin Jackson. If/when Miguel Cabrera wins the Triple Crown, he can thank Jackson for getting on base at a .376 clip, a massive improvement over last year's .317 OBP, providing Cabrera with more RBI opportunities.  The other key was, of course, Cabrera's primary protection in the cleanup spot: Prince Fielder, who put up a typically fantastic offensive season. The rest of the Tigers' offense was mediocre; Jackson, Cabrera, and Fielder were essential.

2. Justin Verlander: He's the best pitcher in baseball and it's no accident that his two best seasons have coincided with Detroit's back-to-back division titles. His numbers are almost identical--only very slightly worse--than 2011; he just isn't getting MVP consideration again because his win-loss record isn't as gaudy as last year. Verlander once again led the league in innings and strikeouts with a stellar 2.64 ERA. It would be difficult to prove that Miguel Cabrera is definitely more valuable to the success of the Tigers than Verlander.

3. A Strong Rotation: It wasn't just Verlander in the Tigers' pitching staff. Max Scherzer struggled to open the year, but he's been an ace since July and leads the league in strikeout rate. Doug Fister has been his usual self when healthy; when not, rookie Drew Smyly has been there to provide solid innings. And midseason trade acquisition Anibal Sanchez has given the Tigers 12 starts and a solid 3.74 ERA, including a 2.43 ERA during their September run at the division.

There are probably six teams in the American League that are better than the Tigers, and two of them didn't even make the playoffs. Detroit benefited greatly from the weakness of the AL Central (dozens of games against the Twins, Royals, and Indians). This team failed to even reach 90 wins over the course of the season because it lacks in depth, especially in the lineup. But the Tigers will always be a dangerous playoff team because of their roster construction: it's very top-heavy.

You can make the argument that Detroit has both the best hitter and the best pitcher in baseball. Between Justin Verlander, Miguel Cabrera, and Prince Fielder, no team has a better trio of players. Then throw in Austin Jackson, three more solid starters, and one or two good bullpen arms, and suddenly the weakness of the rest of Detroit's roster doesn't really matter. Tigers GM Dave Dombrowski has emphasized the acquisition of high-upside players regardless of cost, and the impact of that decision is clear.

What makes Dombrowski's strategy unique is that he doesn't have one set method of executing it. His modus operandi is simply to acquire the players with the highest upside, and he's achieved that end through every possible variety of roster construction. He's not afraid of paying big bonuses in the draft, which is how he got Justin Verlander. He's not afraid of trading away a gigantic haul of prospects, which is how he got Miguel Cabrera. He's willing to spend big dollars on the free agent market, which is how he got Prince Fielder. He's not afraid of dealing off established contributors (Curtis Granderson, Edwin Jackson) in exchange for exciting, unproven young players, which is how he got Austin Jackson and Max Scherzer. He's made deadline trades before, which is how he got Doug Fister and Anibal Sanchez. Dombrowski isn't shy about pursuing any means to achieve his end.

The downside to this course of action is Detroit's payroll. A massive chunk of it is devoted to just a few guys, which is why the rest of the roster lacks in quality. But it's hard to argue that this strategy doesn't work after back-to-back AL Central titles.

Detroit's Formula: Good starting pitching and an elite top of the lineup, achieved through the acquisition of elite players by any means.

San Francisco's Formula: Healthy starting pitching, dominant bullpen, and a lineup built for home-field advantage achieved through strong pitching development and the revitalization of declining veterans' careers.

Washington's Formula: Healthy and elite starting pitching, dominant bullpen, and balanced lineup achieved through homegrown talent and superb talent evaluation.

Cincinnati's Formula: Healthy starting pitching, dominant bullpen, and balanced lineup achieved through homegrown talent and low payroll.

How They Did It: The 2012 San Francisco Giants

On August 15, the San Francisco Giants' All-Star outfielder Melky Cabrera was suspended for the remainder of the season for violating MLB's drug policy. At the time, the Giants were tied with the Dodgers atop the NL West. This stunning news, coupled with LA's soon-to-be-consummated deal with Boston to acquire Adrian Gonzalez, made most onlookers wonder whether or not the Giants would make the playoffs, let alone with the division. And what ended up happening? A few days ago, the Giants clinched the NL West title, outpacing their competition by 10 games since the Melky suspension. But how?

1. Healthy Starting Pitching: This is a common thread for the NL playoff teams. Like the Reds and Nationals, the Giants have survived the season without a major pitching injury besides closer Brian Wilson. A pair of aces led the way (Matt Cain and Madison Bumgarner) followed by two dependable mid-rotation arms (Ryan Vogelsong and the immortal Barry Zito). Shockingly, Tim Lincecum was the weak link in the group; he posted the worst ERA (5.15) of any qualified starter in the league. At least he stayed healthy.

2. A Clutch Offense Catered To AT&T Park: The Giants' home ballpark is huge. It's very hard to hit home runs there. So instead of packing the lineup with all-or-nothing power hitters, the Giants rely on batting average, speed, and simply putting the ball in play. The result? The fewest home runs in baseball, but the second-most hits with runners in scoring position as well as the most sacrifice flies. Before his suspension, Melky Cabrera was hitting a league-leading .346; Buster Posey is hitting over .330; Marco Scutaro's average with the Giants after his midseason trade is up to over .360. And five Giants have double-digit steals. Despite the power outage and Cabrera's absence, San Francisco is still the sixth-best scoring offense in the National League thanks to sustained rallies, speedy baseruners, and sacrifice hits.

3. A Dominant Bullpen: Another similarity with the Reds and Nationals. The Giants losing closer Brian Wilson for the season was supposed to cripple their bullpen. Instead, others have stepped up. Sergio Romo (1.82 ERA) and Santiago Casilla (2.74 ERA) have replaced Wilson effectively and the 'pen also features a trio of lefties with sub-3.00 ERAs.

4. Buster Posey: The Reds and Nationals relied heavily on their offensive centerpieces, but not nearly as much as the Giants have depended on Buster Posey. Not only did he manage an excellent pitching staff as the catcher; Posey is hitting nearly .340, getting on base over 40% of the time, and has smashed 23 home runs. He's hitting .389 in the second half of the season. He's probably going to win the NL MVP award. He deserves it.

5. Winning Trades: The Giants didn't turn to expensive free agnents to upgrade their team. Instead, they found surplus value on the trade market. They traded for two starting outfielders before the season, Angel Pagan and Melky Cabrera. During the summer, they brought in Hunter Pence at right field, Marco Scutaro at shortstop, and Jose Mijares in the bullpen. They haven't missed anything they've given up, either.

The Giants were criticized this offseason for failing to spend money on a team one year removed from a World Series title. They just stuck to the two things they do best: developing pitching from within and revitalizing the careers of washed-up veterans. The formula worked like a charm in their championship season of 2010, when a rotation of four homegrown starters and a lineup of veteran cast-offs (Aubrey Huff, Edgar Renteria, Juan Uribe, Cody Ross, Pat Burrell...) won it all. And it worked again in 2012.

The Giants have one of the best righty-lefty combinations at the top of their starting rotation, both of whom came up through the farm system. Matt Cain notched yet another 200+ inning season, and his ERA is under 3.00. Madison Bumgarner is only 23, but he too threw over 200 innings, with an ERA of just 3.37. His strikeout-to-walk rate is even better than Cain's. San Francisco drafted them, developed them, and have signed both to long-term contracts.

But what truly defines San Francisco's roster construction is their uncanny ability to pick up terrible veterans no one wants, get ridiculed for doing so, and then turn those players into useful contributors again. The best example is Ryan Vogelsong. Vogelsong was a career journeyman who had never experienced even remote success in the big leagues before coming to San Francisco last year. Since then, he's thrown 364.1 innings with an ERA of 3.09. Angel Pagan suffered a down year for the Mets, so the Giants traded for him; he's hitting .287, has stolen 29 bases, and leads the league in triples. Marco Scutaro was hitting .271 in 95 games with the Colorado Rockies when the Giants traded for him and with his new team, Scutaro has hit .360 and knocked in 41 runs. It's fairly remarkable that while the rest of baseball has put such an emphasis on getting younger, the Giants keep getting by with cheap, older guys. It's hard to argue with a strategy that has won the franchise two NL West titles and a World Series in the past three years.

San Francisco's Formula: Healthy starting pitching, dominant bullpen, and a lineup built for home-field advantage achieved through strong pitching development and the revitalization of declining veterans' careers.

Washington's Formula: Healthy and elite starting pitching, dominant bullpen, and balanced lineup achieved through homegrown talent and superb talent evaluation.

Cincinnati's Formula: Healthy starting pitching, dominant bullpen, and balanced lineup achieved through homegrown talent and low payroll.

How They Did It: The 2012 Washington Nationals

Last Thursday, Nationals closer Drew Storen struck out Matt Kemp, Adrian Gonzalez, and Hanley Ramirez to seal the team's 4-1 win over the Dodgers. That victory officially brought postseason baseball back to Washington D.C. for the first time since 1933. What's more: the Nats have the best record in baseball and will clinch the NL East sometime over the next few days. This team hadn't even finished above .500 since 2003, and now they're World Series favorites. How did the Nationals turn their franchise around so dramatically?

1. A Remade Rotation: In 2009 and 2010, John Lannan was the Nationals' Opening Day starter. Just two years later, at the conclusion of spring training this year, Lannan was optioned to the minor leagues because there wasn't a spot for him in the rotation. Over those two years, the Nationals brought up three starters drafted by the team (Stephen Strasburg, Jordan Zimmermann, Ross Detwiler), signed one in free agency (Edwin Jackson), and traded for another one (Gio Gonzalez). Jackson has the highest ERA among the five starters, and his is 3.77. Gonzalez is in the conversation for NL Cy Young as a 20-game winner. Even with Strasburg shut down for the season, the Nats still have Lannan to replace him. This was the best rotation in baseball.

2. A Shutdown Bullpen: Just like the Reds, the Nats supplemented their strong rotation with a surprisingly great bullpen. Drew Storen has returned from injury to reclaim the closer role, which was held admirably by Tyler Clippard (32 saves). Craig Stammen, Ryan Mattheus, and Sean Burnett each appeared in at least 54 games and posted sub-3.00 ERAs.

3. Veterans Bouncing Back: The three players in the middle of the Nationals lineup were all coming off disappointing and/or injury-filled seasons in 2011. They all successfully turned it around. Adam LaRoche hit 31 home runs after only playing in 43 games last year. Ryan Zimmerman has been healthy enough to drive in 90+ runs at third base. Jayson Werth has missed half the season due to injury, but his OPS has risen over 100 points from last year.

4. Breakout Performances: The Nats saw three of their young position players step up. 19-year-old rookie Bryce Harper was an instant contributor, with 50 extra-base hits. The team's double-play combination, Ian Desmond and Danny Espinosa, combined for 39 homers and 37 steals of their own. Desmond was one of the most clutch performers in the league, too.

5. Outlasting Adversity: The Nationals rotation stayed healthy through much of the year, but the rest of the team suffered through more than their fair share of injuries. Werth, Desmond, and Michael Morse all missed significant time on offense. Their Opening Day catcher was lost for the season after 25 games. Closer Drew Storen missed most of the year. The Nationals' ability to patch these holes internally with a strong bench helped them keep winning consistently throughout the season.

So what was the Nationals' formula? It was very similar to the Reds' formula (only except for the fact that the Nats were more willing to spend on free agents). Both teams built effective, durable rotations supplemented by good bullpens and above-average offenses. Both teams used their prospect depth to trade for young aces over the offseason, the Reds with Mat Latos and the Nationals with Gio Gonzalez. Both teams have just one cornerstone offensive player (Joey Votto and Ryan Zimmerman) and surrounded that guy with quality players.

But most of all like the Reds, the core of Washington's roster was homegrown. Some would say: sure, how hard can it be to draft Stephen Strasburg and Bryce Harper? While it's true that the Nats chose the two perfect years to pick #1 overall in the draft, allowing them to draft two generational talents, there's more to it than that. The team also hit on Jordan Zimmermann and Ross Detwiler in the rotation; Drew Storen in the bullpen; Ryan Zimmerman and Ian Desmond and Danny Espinosa in the infield. Other teams had chances to draft those guys, but the Nats were the ones who grabbed them.

Another key component of the Nationals' success: great trades. It starts with Gio Gonzalez. The Nats gave up four premium prospects to get him from Oakland and most analysts were skeptical of the move because, they argued, Gonzalez couldn't be a true ace with such iffy control. All Gonzalez did with his new team was lower his walks, increase his strikeouts, and win 20 games. Washington has also traded for catcher Wilson Ramos, left fielder Michael Morse, and bullpen aces Tyler Clippard and Ryan Mattheus without giving up anything of note.

The Nationals' wild success in the draft and on the trade market reveals their secret to turning around this sorry franchise: they're supremely good at scouting and evaluating talent. In other words, the scouts they employ are most likely more competent than the ones in "Moneyball." The reward has been a dominant pitching staff, several cornerstone position players, and very soon, the NL East title.

Washington's Formula: Healthy and elite starting pitching, dominant bullpen, and balanced lineup achieved through homegrown talent and superb talent evaluation.

Cincinnati's Formula: Healthy starting pitching, dominant bullpen, and balanced lineup achieved through homegrown talent and low payroll.

How They Did It: The 2012 Cincinnati Reds

On Thursday afternoon, the Reds trotted out a lineup featuring Miguel Cairo, Xavier Paul, and something called Didi Gregorious. It was a lineup one would expect to see from a team long removed from playoff contention. But by beating the Cubs 5-3 with their B-team squad, the Cincinnati Reds moved to 91-59 and clinched the first playoff spot of the 2012 season. Entering the season, most people thought the NL Central would be closely contested deep into the final month of the season, but the Reds may end up winning it by double-digit games. Here are the five biggest factors behind Cincinnati's fantastic season.

1. A Healthy Starting Rotation: It is truly stunning that the five starters in the Reds' original rotation have accounted for all but one of the team's starts this year. Congratulations to Johnny Cueto, Mat Latos, Bronson Arroyo, Homer Bailey, and Mike Leake, all of whom will make over 30 starts this season. Cueto will be in consideration for the Cy Young with another sub-3.00 ERA season.

2. An Unheralded Rookie: Sharing a league with Bryce Harper is tough, but Reds infielder Todd Frazier was the better player in 2012 and might win the Rookie of the Year award. His .284/.345/.517 line was crucial for a team that lost both Joey Votto and Scott Rolen to injuries at the corner infield positions.

3. A Free Agent Bargain: After a disastrous 2011, Ryan Ludwick's career was on life support. The Reds picked him up on a one-year deal and were criticized for giving playing time to an over-the-hill veteran instead of a youngster like Frazier. At the moment, Ludwick has a better OPS than Albert Pujols. The outfielder has hit 26 home runs while slugging .532. The Reds caught lightning in a bottle here.

4. A Shutdown Bullpen: The Reds signed Ryan Madson to be their closer for 2012. When they lost him for the season before he even threw a pitch, the assumption was that the Reds bullpen would take a massive hit. Instead, it was probably the best in baseball. The dominance of replacement closer Aroldis Chapman has been well-documented (he's striking out nearly half the batters he's facing and his WHIP is below 0.80). The Reds also had five other relievers throw at least 50 innings, and the highest ERA among them was 3.18. That doesn't even include midseason trade acquisition Jonathan Broxton, a former closer now pitching the 7th and 8th innings for the Reds. This unit will be a huge asset come playoff time.

5. Homegrown Players: The Reds are great at developing their own talent, which they use in two different ways. They have developed young players into long-time starters, like Joey Votto, Jay Bruce, and Johnny Cueto. They also use their prospects to trade for more pieces, which they did this year to get number-two starter Mat Latos and setup men Sean Marshall and Jonathan Broxton. And it's not like the pipeline is drying up; despite those trades, the Reds still had talented rookies Todd Frazier, Zack Cozart, Chris Heisey, and Devin Mesoraco to plug into the lineup in 2012. Cincinnati's only notable free agent signings this offseason were Ryan Madson, who didn't pitch at all, and Ryan Ludwick, who came dirt-cheap. And the Reds are massively outperforming teams that spent tens of millions of dollars, like the Angels, Tigers, and Marlins. This is how you thrive in a small market.

Different teams find success in different ways. Cincinnati's formula was a simple one. They only had three superstars: one in the lineup (Votto), one in the rotation (Cueto), and one in the bullpen (Chapman). To fill in the rest of the roster, they didn't spend big money on free agents. Instead, they found effective complementary players in their own system and on the trade market. Their reward was an NL Central title despite a sub-$90 million payroll.

As more teams clinch playoff spots, their methods of crafting a winning roster will be examined too, and we'll see which strategies were the most successful. It's hard to beat what the Reds have accomplished here.

Cincinnati's Formula: Healthy starting pitching, dominant bullpen, and balanced lineup achieved through homegrown talent and low payroll.